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ABSTRACT 
 
In April 2016, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative placed Switzerland on the Watch List of its 
2016 Special 301 Report, which contains an annual review 
of the state of intellectual property rights protection and 
enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world. 
According to the Report, the decision to put Switzerland on 
the Watch List was premised on U.S. concerns regarding 
specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of online 
copyright protection and enforcement, particularly the 
“Logistep” ruling issued by the Federal Supreme Court of 
Switzerland in 2010. Although the Swiss authorities have 
acknowledged the difficulties mentioned in the Special 301 
Report, the fierce criticism raised by the U.S. seems 
inappropriate, as the Swiss federal legislature decided long 
ago to remedy the shortcomings in the Swiss Copyright Act 
and initiated the appropriate legislative procedures in 
                                                                                                             
*
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2012. Due to the nature of Switzerland’s direct democracy, 
however, the legislative process is still in progress, with the 
parliament awaiting the results of the public consultation 
procedure during the course of the year. Despite this clear 
roadmap, the United States is increasing its pressure on the 
Swiss government and encourages it to move forward with 
concrete and effective measures that address copyright 
piracy in an appropriate and effective manner.  
Over the same period of time, the most recent 
legislative proposals in the field of copyright law in the 
United States have come to an abrupt halt. Unprecedented 
public outcry against the legislative proposals in 2012 led 
to the so-called SOPA and PIPA online protests, which 
resulted in a political deadlock in the field of copyright law 
and policymaking. In the eyes of several legal scholars, 
these protests have revealed a lack of democratic 
legitimacy in the federal legislative process in the United 
States, as it denies the general public any meaningful form 
of participation.  
Focusing on the respective histories of copyright law 
and policy in the United States and Switzerland, this Article 
examines how copyright lobbyists and other special interest 
groups assert their influence in the legislative process, and 
how their influence can be diminished. Illustrated by the 
example of copyright legislation, the Article shows that the 
instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland—which 
ultimately caused the delays addressed in the Special 301 
Report—not only effectively counterbalance the effect of 
legislative lobbying, but also help to enhance public 
acceptance of legislative proposals in general. Ultimately, 
this Article claims that the United States could strengthen 
the democratic legitimacy of its federal legislative process 
by implementing a mandatory public consultation 
procedure based on the model of Switzerland, which might 
create a first step towards breaking the current standoff in 
U.S. copyright lawmaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“On the premise that rational political opinion- and 
will-formation is at all possible, the principle of 
democracy only tells us how this can be institutionalized, 
namely, through a system of rights that secures for each 
person an equal participation in a process of legislation. . 
. .”1 
 
In the spring of every year, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) releases its Special 301 Report in 
which it reviews the state of intellectual property rights protection 
and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world.
2
 By 
referring to itself as a “positive catalyst for change,” the report 
claims to serve the critical function of identifying opportunities 
and challenges facing U.S.-based innovative and creative 
industries operating in foreign markets.
3
 After several unsuccessful 
attempts, the USTR eventually followed the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance’s (“IIPA”)4 repeated 
recommendations and placed Switzerland on the 2016 Watch List. 
According to the Report, the USTR based its decision on national 
concerns regarding specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of 
online copyright protection and enforcement.
5
  
                                                                                                             
1
 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 110 (William Rehg trans., Polity 
Press 1998).  
2
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2016 Special 301 Report 
Executive Summary, (Apr., 2016), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf. 
3
 Id. 
4
 The IIPA is a private sector coalition formed in 1984, composed of trade 
associations representing U.S. copyright-based industries; the coalition works to 
improve international protection and enforcement of copyrighted materials and 
to open foreign markets closed by piracy and other market access barriers. See 
Letter to Mr. Probir Mehta, Acting Assistant USTR for IP and Innovation, IIPA 
(Feb. 5, 2016), available at 
http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016SPEC301COVERLETTER.PDF.  
5
 International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 2016 Special 301 
4
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As the world’s greatest producer of intellectual property, 
the United States has a transparent interest in granting writers, 
artists, and other creators of copyrighted material strong protection 
from online piracy in the digital age.
6
 In fact, apart from some 
philosophical discrepancies, there is a worldwide consensus that 
granting creators certain exclusive rights in their works of 
authorship plays a significant role in advancing cultural diversity.
7
 
The crucial question is, therefore, not whether such rights should 
be protected, but rather how to secure that protection in an 
increasingly connected world.  
From a substantive point of view, it is still unclear what 
impact online piracy has truly caused.
8
 While the copyright 
industry appears to remain strong and thriving, it is certainly 
possible that online piracy has prevented the industry from 
                                                                                                             
Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement, Country Report Switzerland, 
IIPA (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://www.iipawebsite.com/rbc/2016/2016SPEC301SWITZERLAND.PDF, at 
55.  
6
 National Crime Prevention Council, Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real: 
Facts and Figures (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-and-figures-1.  
7
 Paul Goldstein & P. Bernt Hugenholz, Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ: 
Pʀɪɴᴄɪᴘʟᴇs, Lᴀᴡ, ᴀɴᴅ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴄᴇ 7 (Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 
2012). 
8
 Although the economic profession has taken a significant number of 
attempts to tackle this empirical issue, a recently published meta-analysis from 
the University of Warsaw suggests that there is no clear conclusion on whether 
and how unauthorized online-distribution of cultural goods affects their 
authorized sales. The study identified three reasons why the literature, after two 
decades of research, is so unequivocal: (1) the terms “sales” and “digital piracy” 
belong to a group of poorly measurable phenomena; (2) there is no proper 
instrument to identify a causal link; and (3) the complexity of the phenomenon 
of “digital piracy”, including the cases of upload piracy, leak piracy, potential 
piracy and the lag between the piracy and the observed sales. See Wojciech 
Hardy, Michael Krawczyk, and Joanna Tyrowics, Friends of Foes? A Meta-
Analysis of the Link between “Online Piracy” and Sales of Cultural Goods, 
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Working Papers No. 
23/2015 (171), available at 
http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/files/9214/3741/1680/WNE_WP171.pdf.  
5
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growing even further.
9
 Thus, this Article deliberately refrains from 
making substantive suggestions with respect to how copyright 
protection should be secured. Instead, it confines itself to the 
procedural questions, offering a comparative legal analysis of the 
law and policymaking processes in the United States and 
Switzerland.  
The key impetus to this Article was the 2012 Stop Online 
Piracy Act (“SOPA”) protest (also known as the SOPA and PIPA 
Internet blackout, or simply the “SOPA strike”) which successfully 
derailed copyright legislation in the United States for years. 
Approximately six months after this unparalleled legislative defeat 
for the copyright-based industries in the United States, the Federal 
Council of Switzerland decided to close the gaps in its copyright 
infringement enforcement by initiating the legislative process, 
which is required in order to amend the Swiss Copyright Act.
10
 By 
the end of 2015, nearly four years after the SOPA protest, the 
Federal Council submitted the preliminary draft for the revised 
Copyright Act, which then became subject to the public 
consultation procedure until March 31, 2016.
11
 During the same 
period, the United States Copyright Office announced that it 
intended to conduct a study evaluating the impact and 
effectiveness of the DMCA safe harbor provisions, seeking public 
input on a number of key questions and accepting written 
submissions until April 1, 2016.
12
  
As a matter of coincidence, the legislative authorities of the 
United States and Switzerland simultaneously invited the general 
                                                                                                             
9
 Mike Belleville, IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight over Online Piracy, 
26 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 303, 330. 
10
 Urheberrechtsgesetz [URG], Loi sur le droit d’auteur [LDA], Legge sul 
diritto d’autore [LDA] [Copyright Act] Oct. 9, 1992, SR 231.1 (Switz.) 
(hereafter COPA). 
11
 Media Release, Federal Council of Switzerland (Dec. 11, 2015), 
available at 
https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Urheberrecht/e/modernisierung_urhe
berrecht_2015_e/Medienmitteilung_2015_12_11_EN.pdf.  
12
 Federal Register, Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public 
Comment, Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, 80 FR 81862, available 
at https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-32973.  
6
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public to participate in the further development of copyright law 
and policy in their respective countries. The ideas behind the 
procedures, however, strongly differed from one another. The 
Section 512 study in the United States took place outside of a 
specific legislative proposal. By contrast, the mandatory 
consultation procedure in Switzerland is an integral part of the 
country’s federal legislation process, intended to provide 
information on material accuracy, feasibility of implementation, 
and public acceptance of a specific federal project.
13
 Using 
copyright law as a practical example, this Article seeks to prove 
that the implementation of direct democratic procedures such as 
the mandatory consultation procedure in the legislative process 
successfully prevents special interest groups from asserting undue 
influence upon legislative decision-making.  
The remainder of this Article unfolds in four parts. Part I 
provides a brief overview of the international framework regarding 
copyright protection and its deficiencies in the field of copyright 
enforcement. It explains why the problems of online piracy can 
only be solved through domestic legislation. Part II discusses the 
influence of special interest groups on U.S. copyright legislation 
and how the 2012 SOPA protests changed the political landscape 
for corporate lobbyists in the field of copyright law. Shifting 
perspective, Part III provides insight into the history of Swiss 
copyright law and policy, focusing on the origins, rationale, and 
aftermath of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s Logistep decision. 
Part III further discusses the preliminary draft for the Swiss 
Copyright Act and explains how the direct-democratic elements of 
the federal legislative process successfully counterbalance the 
influence asserted by special interest groups in the legislative 
process. Coming full circle, Part IV discusses the shortcomings of 
the federal legislative process in the United States and explains 
how the implementation of a mandatory consultation procedure on 
the federal level based on the model of Switzerland would not only 
enhance the general public’s acceptance of copyright legislation, 
                                                                                                             
13
 Vernehmlassungsgesetz [VlG], Loi sur a consultation [LCo], Legga sulla 
consultazione [LCo][Consultation Procedure Act] Mar. 18, 2005, SR 172.061, 
art. 2 (Switz.). 
7
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but also help to break the current standoff in copyright 
policymaking. 
 
I. ONLINE PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
  
A.   The International Framework 
 
Throughout history, lawmakers all over the world have 
been required to modify their copyright laws in response to new 
technologies that facilitated the reproduction of pre-existing 
works.
14
 In the Digital Age, this requirement still holds true. The 
growing availability of digital content and broadband Internet 
access, along with the rise of affordable cloud storage services, 
enables the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted music, 
movies, television programs, software, video games, books, and 
images to flourish around the world.
15
 Because of its simplicity, 
the online distribution process poses a significant challenge for 
copyright owners who wish to maintain control over their works. 
Taking into account how the widespread use of smartphones 
allows the Internet to pervade even the remotest corners of the 
planet, it should be obvious that online infringement of 
copyrighted material is a challenge that calls for a global 
solution.
16
 Due to various political and procedural difficulties, 
however, a unified answer to the problem of online piracy is still a 
long way off.
17
  
International copyright issues are primarily handled 
through two treaties: The Berne Convention and Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS”).18 When the 
Berne Convention was enacted in 1886, its primary purpose was to 
                                                                                                             
14
 Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From 
Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 203, 227. 
15
 Daniel Castro, Richard Bennett & Scott Andes, Steal These Policies: 
Strategies for Reducing Digital Piracy, The Information and Technology & 
Innovation Foundation, Executive Summary (Dec. 2009). 
16
 Belleville, supra note 9 at 331. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. at 332. 
8
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protect the rights of authors on an international level.
19
 To make 
sure that authors’ rights would be respected internationally, the 
Berne Convention created a “floor of protections” by establishing 
minimum standards to which all member countries must adhere.
20
  
The question of how to enforce those minimum standards 
was in focus when the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
enacted TRIPS in 1994.
21
 TRIPS’ enforcement provisions are 
based on two different ideas of enforcement.
22
 First, in order to 
enable copyright owners to assert their rights in all WTO member 
countries, TRIPS requires that the civil and criminal enforcement 
procedures in member countries meet certain performance 
standards.
23
 Second, if a member country fails to comply with the 
standards expected of its national laws, other member countries 
can enforce the standards by bringing a complaint under the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism.
24
  
In theory, TRIPS created an enforcement mechanism for all 
WTO members. In practice, however, its broad and general 
language does not provide a clear enough standard.
25
 Article 41(1) 
of TRIPS merely states that “members shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement . . . .” 26 
Naturally, such an ambiguous legal standard makes it hard 
for member countries to settle any disputes.
27
 While some scholars 
                                                                                                             
19
 Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the 
Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 1, 15 (1988). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Part III, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (hereinafter “TRIPS”).  
22
 Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS 111 (2011). 
23
 Belleville, supra note 9 at 316. 
24
 Taubman, supra note 22. 
25
 Belleville, supra note 9 at 316.   
26
 TRIPS at art. 41(1). 
27
 Peter K. Yu, TRIPS ᴀɴᴅ Iᴛs Aᴄʜɪʟʟᴇs’ Hᴇᴇʟ, 18 J. Intell Prop. L. 479, 
9
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describe these enforcement provisions as the agreement’s Achilles 
heel,
28 the provisions’ lack of clarity may also show that the 
principles underlying copyright law and policy in different 
countries are—despite Berne and TRIPS—far from universal.29 
The American fair use doctrine serves as an excellent illustration 
of this point. While the fair use doctrine mirrors the special place 
of free speech in the United States Constitution, it permits free use 
of copyrighted works under circumstances that other countries 
would find hard to excuse.
30
 
 
B.   Rojadirecta—A Current Example 
 
A more practical example of the lack of international unity 
is the ongoing case of the Spanish TV linking site Rojadirecta, 
which describes itself as “the world’s biggest sport events index”31. 
In 2009, the District Court of Madrid dismissed a complaint 
against Puerto 80, the owner of Rojadirecta, holding that a website 
providing links to infringing content does not violate copyright 
law.
32
 In 2010, the Appellate Court of Madrid sided with the 
District Court’s earlier decision and concluded that Rojadirecta 
was a legal operation.
33
  
In contrast, in 2011, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York authorized the seizure of two 
                                                                                                             
482 (2011) (quoting J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bᴀʀɢᴀɪɴɪɴɢ Aʀᴏᴜɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ 
TRIPS Aɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ: Tʜᴇ Cᴀsᴇ fᴏʀ Oɴɢᴏɪɴɢ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ-Pʀɪᴠᴀᴛᴇ Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇs ᴛᴏ 
Fᴀᴄɪʟɪᴛᴀᴛᴇ Wᴏʀʟᴅᴡɪᴅᴇ Iɴᴛᴇʟʟᴇᴄᴛᴜᴀʟ Pʀᴏᴘᴇʀᴛʏ Tʀᴀɴsᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴs, 9 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int'l L. 11, 35, 38-39. (1998)) 
28
 Id. 
29
 Goldstein, supra note 7 at 4. 
30
 Id. at 5.  
31
 See Rojadirecta, Rojadirecta TV (last visited on Sept. 22, 2016), 
available at http://www.rojadirecta.tv.   
32
 Enigmax, Streaming and Bittorrent Sports Links Site Declared Legal, 
Torrentfreak (Jul. 24, 2009), available at https://torrentfreak.com/streaming-
and-bittorrent-sports-links-site-declared-legal-090724.  
33
 Ernesto, Sports Streaming / Torrent Link Site Victorious in Court, 
Torrentfreak (May 10, 2010), available at https://torrentfreak.com/sports-
streaming-torrent-links-site-victorious-in-court-100510. 
10
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domains belonging to Puerto 80: rojadirecta.com and 
rojadirecta.org. The district court held that the domain names were 
subject to forfeiture because they had been used to commit 
criminal violations of copyright law by providing links to streams 
of sporting events taking place in the United States.
34
 Following 
the seizure, Puerto 80 successfully petitioned the U.S. government 
to return the domains in 2012.
35
 The legal dispute continued into 
June 2015, when the District Court of Madrid approved a 
complaint from the Spanish Professional Football League (“LFP”) 
and ruled that Puerto 80 was prohibited from linking to 
unauthorized streams of football events to which the corporations 
“Mediapro” and “Gol Television” owned the rights.36  
Given the discrepancy in verdicts between the United 
States and Spain with regard to Rojadirecta’s services, it is not 
surprising that there is no international consensus as to what 
exactly constitutes copyright infringement. 
 
C.   International Copyright Enforcement: Quo Vadis? 
 
If two member countries disagree on whether an online 
service based in one country violates copyright law, the minimum 
protection standards of the Berne Convention and the enforcement 
provisions in TRIPS become highly ineffective.
37
 Even if matters 
rise to a government-to-government level, findings of non-
compliance in a TRIPS dispute settlement can only be enforced 
through international trade relations by denying other trade 
                                                                                                             
34
 Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States of America and, Department 
of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 11 Civ. 3983 
(S.D. N.Y. 2011). 
35
 Julie Samuels, Rojadirecta: The Government Reverses Course and 
Returns Domain without Explanation. Again, Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(Aug. 29, 2012), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/rojadirecta-
government-reverses-course-and-returns-domains-without-explanation.  
36
 Ernesto, Court Forbids Rojadirecta to Stream Football, or else…, 
Torrentfreak (Jun. 23, 2015), available at https://torrentfreak.com/court-forbids-
rojadirecta-to-stream-football-or-else-150623.  
37
 See Belleville, supra note 9 at 331.    
11
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benefits in retaliation.
38
 In a statement before the Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property regarding international piracy, former United 
States Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters concluded that: 
 
 “The TRIPS agreement has been a tremendously valuable tool 
in advancing the development of legal structures to support 
enforcement of copyright around the world. […] Despite all these 
accomplishments, the fact remains that copyright enforcement in 
too many countries around the world is extremely lax, allowing 
staggeringly high piracy rates. . . .”39 
 
In recognition of the fact that the current framework under 
Berne and TRIPS had not been sufficiently developed to provide 
an appropriate solution to online copyright enforcement, the 
United States and Japan began discussions on a new multilateral 
treaty to combat counterfeiting and piracy in 2006.
40
 The resulting 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), however, was 
dealt a serious blow when the European Parliament made use of its 
Lisbon Treaty power to reject international trade agreements and 
voted against ACTA in July 2012 by 478 to 39 votes.
41
 To this 
day, Japan is the only country that has formally approved the 
treaty.
42
  
The United States has subsequently focused its efforts on 
                                                                                                             
38
See generally  Taubman, supra note 22. 
39
 U.S. Copyright Office, Statement of Marybeth Peters Before the 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session (2005), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat052505.html.  
40
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ACTA - Summary of 
Key Elements under Discussion (2009), available at https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-
elements-under-discussion.  
41
 European Parliament Press Release, European Parliament rejects ACTA 
(Jul. 4, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20120703IPR48247/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA.  
42
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Conclusion of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by Japan (Oct. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta_conclusion_1210.html.  
12
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two other multinational agreements, both with significant potential 
to influence the international IP protection standard: the Trans-
Pacific Partnership
43
 (“TPP”)—signed on February 2016 in 
Auckland—and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership
44
 (“T-TIP”) with the European Union, which is still in 
negotiations.  
Although these two agreements may rectify certain 
deficiencies in intellectual property enforcement, they are unlikely 
to bring online copyright infringement to a halt. The main issue 
with regard to online copyright enforcement is that index services, 
such as Rojadirecta, can easily escape jurisdiction by moving their 
domains to other countries, essentially playing a “whack-a-mole 
game” with both domestic and international law enforcement 
agencies, in which the index services always stay one step ahead.
45
  
In light of the Berne Convention’s weaknesses, the key to a 
successful international online copyright enforcement system in 
the future is to ensure that all countries follow the same principles. 
While such harmonization cannot be achieved by pushing 
countries into signing multinational treaties, the copyright-based 
industries in the Unites States have illustrated that lobbying efforts 
on a domestic level can be highly effective.  
 
II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE SOPA / PIPA PROTESTS 
  
A.   Copyright Lawmaking in the United States 
  
Over the past two centuries, copyright protection in the 
United States has grown significantly. When the first Federal 
Copyright Act of 1790 was enacted, it granted the rights to 
                                                                                                             
43
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Minister’s Statement (Feb. 4, 2016), available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement.  
44
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), available at https://ustr.gov/ttip.   
45
 See Peter W. Singer, Allan Friedman, Cʏʙᴇʀsᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ Cʏʙᴇʀᴡᴀʀ: 
Wʜᴀᴛ Eᴠᴇʀʏᴏɴᴇ Nᴇᴇᴅs ᴛᴏ Kɴᴏᴡ 194 (2008). 
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reproduce and distribute any map, chart, or book to its respective 
author for fourteen years.
46
 A renewal term of fourteen additional 
years could be obtained, provided that the author survived 
throughout the first term.
47
 Each new version of the Copyright Act 
since the 1790 Act has provided longer, broader, and more 
powerful protections.
48
 Today, the Copyright Act provides that 
copyright protection subsists in all original works of authorship 
fixed in tangible mediums of expression, including sound 
recordings, audiovisual works, and architectural works.
49
 In 
addition, the copyright term has been extended to the life of the 
author plus seventy years,
 50
 and the initial exclusive rights have 
been expanded by the rights of derivative works, public 
performance, and public display.
51
  
In recent decades, many intellectual property scholars have 
applied public choice theory to explain this continuous copyright 
expansion, pointing out the enormous influence of corporate right 
holders over the legislative process.
52
 Generally speaking, public 
choice theory suggests that well-organized groups with substantial 
resources and clearly defined interests tend to have proportionally 
greater political influence than the public at large.
53
 According to 
modern public choice theory, also referred to as interest group 
theory, legislation is considered “a good demanded and supplied 
much [like] other goods.”54 Legislators are primarily motivated by 
their interest to be reelected, whereas interest groups hold useful 
political resources, such as financial support, public exposure, and 
                                                                                                             
46
 See William F. Patry, Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Lᴀᴡ ᴀɴᴅ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴄᴇ, Ch. 1 (2014). 
47
 See id.  
48
 See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory 
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (Spring, 
2001).  
49
 Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
50
 Id. §§ 302 (1998). 
51
 Id. §§ 106 (2012). 
52
 See Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 213. 
53
 Neil W. Netanel, Nᴇᴡ Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛɪᴏɴs ɪɴ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Lᴀᴡ Vᴏʟ. 6 3 (2007). 
54
 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 265 (1982). 
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reputation.
55
 As a consequence, legislators are tempted not only to 
use their voting privileges to garner support from influential 
interest groups, but also to avoid choices that may provoke 
opposition from those groups.
56
 
Since copyright law creates enforceable rights for private 
parties, its legislation naturally attracts significant lobbying.
57
 
While corporations may commonly seek advantages that solidify 
and advance their market position, it is important to note that this 
method of aiming for political influence is not necessarily 
malicious or illegal.
58
 The problem is that the interests of lobbying 
entities are often opposed to the interests of the general public.
59
 
Thus, in order to protect public interest in copyright policymaking, 
it is essential that the commercially-driven proposals of the 
copyright-based industries are counterbalanced.
60
 This democratic 
objective can only be achieved if all interested parties are properly 
represented in the legislative process.
61
 Like most legislation in the 
United States, however, copyright legislation presents a severe 
collective action problem that consists of two parts.
62
 As economist 
and social scientist Mancur Olson illustrated, groups that try to 
obtain collective benefits for a large and diffuse body of people are 
unlikely to form in the first place.
63
 Olson argues that even in the 
improbable event that a large number of individuals manages to 
successfully form a group representing the interests of a diffuse 
                                                                                                             
55
 See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 
Stan. L. Rev. 191, 228-30 (2012). 
56
 The Honorable Robert H. Katzmann, Statutes, James Madison Lecture at 
the New York University School of Law (Oct. 18, 2011), in 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
637, 674 (2012). 
57
 See Deborah Tussey, Cᴏᴍᴘʟᴇx Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ: Mᴀᴘᴘɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ Iɴfᴏʀᴍᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 
Eᴄᴏsʏsᴛᴇᴍ 38 (2012). 
58
 Netanel, supra note 53. 
59
 Id. at 4. 
60
 Tarleton Gillespie, Wɪʀᴇᴅ Sʜᴜᴛ: Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Sʜᴀᴘᴇ ᴏf Dɪɢɪᴛᴀʟ 
Cᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴇ 189 (2009). 
61
 Tussey, supra note 57.  
62
 Id. at 39.  
63
 Mancur Olson, Tʜᴇ Lᴏɢɪᴄ ᴏf Cᴏʟʟᴇᴄᴛɪᴠᴇ Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ: Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Gᴏᴏᴅs ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ 
Tʜᴇᴏʀʏ ᴏf Gʀᴏᴜᴘs 9-16 (1971) 
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body of people, issues with collective action—particularly 
information costs and organization costs—are likely to inhibit the 
group’s political activity.64  
As applied to the federal legislative process, Olson’s 
theories certainly help in understanding the development of 
copyright law and policy in the United States. In Digital 
Copyright, Jessica Litman offers a comprehensive historical review 
of the copyright legislative process in the United States that goes 
back to the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act.
65
 The 1909 
Copyright Act was born out of conferences conveyed by the 
Librarian of Congress, which only representatives of interest 
groups attended.
66
 When uninvited parties expressed their 
disapproval of the drafted bill, the representative of the affected 
parties conducted negotiations and agreed on a revised draft that 
was promptly enacted by Congress.
67
 Like their predecessors, the 
drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act depended on negotiations 
among representatives of a variety of interests affected by 
copyright, in order to draft a copyright bill.
68
 As a result, expansive 
rights were balanced by narrow exceptions.
69
 When the bill finally 
emerged from the conferences, it “enlarged the copyright pie and 
divided its pieces among conference participants so that no 
leftovers remained.”70  
The enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
was based on the same multilateral, interindustry negotiation, but 
was “extended to the point of self-parody”, with copyright owners 
securing new rights designed to prevent the discovery of loopholes, 
and diverse powerful players being granted detailed exceptions.
71
 
The only interest groups that had not yet made a deal was the 
drafters were the libraries, universities and schools, and civil 
                                                                                                             
64
 Id. at 35. 
65
 See Jessica Litman, Dɪɢɪᴛᴀʟ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ 35-63 (2000). 
66
 Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 
ORE. L. REV., 284-285 (1989). 
67
 Id. at 286-288. 
68
 Litman, supra note 65 at 37.  
69
 Id. 
70
 Litman, supra note 65 at 31. 
71
 Litman, supra note 65 at 37. 
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liberties and consumer organizations.
72
 Consequently, the 
“internally inconsistent” Digital Millennium Copyright Act did not 
only make non-commercial and non-infringing behavior illegal, 
but also imposed liability on ordinary citizens for violating 
provisions they had no reason to suspect are part of the law.
73
 
Ultimately, Litman argues, the copyright laws of the United States 
“have not been written by Congress or Congressional staffers, not 
by the Copyright Office or any public servant in the executive 
branch, but rather by copyright lobbyists.”74 
Irrespective of whether the public choice argument applies, 
the fact remains that the copyright-based industries in the United 
States have had a strong and lasting influence in drafting copyright 
legislation.
75
 The general public, on the other hand, has historically 
been insufficiently organized to effectively assert its interest, even 
if some lobbying groups such as library associations may claim to 
represent some aspects of the public interest.
76
 After decades of 
successful copyright amendments, however, the so far well-
functioning strategy of extending legal protection was put to an 
unexpected end when Congress set out to enact the copyright 
lobbyists’ most recent proposal: the Stop Online Piracy Act. 
 
B.   The Stop Online Piracy Act 
 
In October 2011, Representative Lamar Smith from Texas 
introduced SOPA in the House of Representatives, attempting to 
combat the unsolved problem of rampant online copyright 
infringement by restricting access to domestic and foreign websites 
that host or facilitate the trading of pirated content.
77
 With respect 
to its key provisions, SOPA strongly related to its Senate 
                                                                                                             
72
 Id. at 37. 
73
 Id. at 145. 
74
 Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350 
(2002). 
75
 Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 206. 
76
 Tussey, supra note 57 at 39. 
77
 Julianne Pepitone, SOPA Explained: What It Is and Why It Matters, CNN 
Money (Jan. 20, 2012), available 
athttp://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained.  
17
Kunz: The Influence of Special Interest Groups on Copyright Law and Pol
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18       WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS      [VOL. 12:1 
counterpart, the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic 
Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (“PIPA”), which 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced in March 2011.
78
  
PIPA and SOPA were never signed into law, despite broad 
initial support in both chambers, as their highly controversial 
provisions created an enormous public outcry over questions of 
free speech and fair use.
79
 On January 18, 2012, more than one 
hundred thousand websites and blogs participated in an 
orchestrated online protest against the bills, which gave them 
widespread and unforeseen coverage in the media.
80
 Internet users 
protested against the bills by posting and tweeting on social media, 
signing online petitions, sending emails, and making millions of 
phone calls to their representatives.
81
 In view of this overwhelming 
opposition, more and more lawmakers started to dissociate from 
the bills. While on the morning of the SOPA strike only 31 
members of Congress opposed the legislation, the number rose to 
142 after the publicized backlash.
82
 Two days after the strike, 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced on Twitter that he 
had decided to postpone the planned vote on PIPA “in light of 
recent events”.83 A few hours later, Representative Lamar Smith 
indefinitely postponed the House discussion of SOPA until there 
was a “wider agreement on a solution.”84  
                                                                                                             
78
 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) (hereinafter “PIPA”). 
79
 Phil Portantino, Finding The Treasure Without Walking The Plank: The 
Critical Need for Properly Tailored Anti-Piracy Laws, 11 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 664, 666 (Spring, 2014).  
80
 The January 18th Blackout / Strike in Numbers and Screenshots, Fight 
For the Future (2011), available at http://www.sopastrike.com/numbers.  
81
 Id.    
82
 Dan Nguyen, SOPA Opera Update: Opposition Surges, Pʀᴏᴘᴜʙʟɪᴄᴀ (Jan. 
19, 2012), available at https://www.propublica.org/nerds/item/sopa-opera-
update.  
83
 Harry Reid, Twitter Feed, Twitter (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:27 AM), available at 
https://twitter.com/SenatorReid/status/160367959464878080?ref_src=twsrc%5E
tfw.  
84
 Hayley Tsukayama, SOPA bill shelved after global protests from Google, 
Wikipedia and others, The Washington Post (Jan. 20, 2012), available at 
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C.   The Reasons Behind SOPA’s Failure 
 
In order to understand the failure of SOPA and PIPA, it is 
important to contextualize the way in which Congress attempted to 
solve the problem of online copyright infringement. Faced with the 
problems caused by online services such as Rojadirecta, the Senate 
created PIPA to target foreign websites that infringed upon U.S. 
copyrights but were difficult to bring to justice under U.S. 
jurisdiction.
85
 To achieve this goal, the bill proposed to grant the 
ability to bring an action against any foreign website to the holder 
of an infringed intellectual property right, provided that the holder 
can show that the targeted website has a connection to the United 
States. The holder could subsequently obtain an injunction that 
would cut the website off from consumers in the United States by 
redirecting its domain name and filtering its domain name from 
search engines.
86
 The simplicity of this approach might appear 
convincing on first sight; however, later opinions and 
commentaries from the legal and technical community raised the 
question of whether Congress really understood its implications.
87
 
Following PIPA’s introduction, a group of 108 law 
professors submitted a joint letter to Congress, arguing that PIPA 
would be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, create 
several technical consequences affecting the security of the 
Internet address system, and undermine U.S. foreign policy.
88
 
                                                                                                             
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-bill-shelved-after-
global-protests-from-google-wikipedia-and-
others/2012/01/20/gIQAN5JdEQ_story.html.  
85
 Michelle Sherman, PROTECT IP Act: One Approach To Dealing With 
Internet Piracy, 15 No. 4 J. Internet L. 3 (Oct. 2011). 
86
 PIPA, S. 986, 112th Cong. (2011), §§ 2(7)(A)(i)-(iii). 
87
 See Mike Masnik, Are There Any Politicians Who Know What Protect IP 
is About?, TᴇᴄʜDɪʀᴛ (Jul. 19, 2011), available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110718/15393615155/are-there-any-
politicians-who-know-what-protect-ip-is-about-senator-hutchison-thinks-its-
about-net-neutrality.shtml.  
88
 Professors’ Letter in Opposition to “Preventing Real Online Threats to 
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011”, United 
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Several members of the technical community also opposed the bill, 
raising concerns about a number of technical issues that the bill 
would create.
89
 These members argued that the proposed domain 
name filtering system would not only produce significant collateral 
damage by preventing users from accessing web sites that were not 
intended to be filtered, but that changes in the operation of the 
domain name system (“DNS”) would create security risks for 
individual users, banks, credit card web sites, and health care 
providers.
90
 In accordance with these concerns, a group of 83 
computer and network engineers who described themselves as a 
“who’s-who of the proud geeks who built the modern Internet” 
wrote an open letter to Congress, warning that compliance with 
SOPA’s and PIPA’s provisions would have “capricious technical 
consequences” for the global DNS and its security and stability.91  
In reaction to these critical voices, Rep. Lamar Smith 
announced three days prior to the blackout that he would remove 
the provisions in SOPA that required Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) to block access to foreign websites accused of piracy.92 
This late attempt to calm the waves was insufficient to prevent the 
announced protests. In hindsight, however, this last-minute 
compromise proposal to save the bill clearly demonstrates the 
significance of including professional expertise in the lawmaking 
process as early as possible. In her article regarding the influence 
of SOPA’s failure on policymaking, Annemarie Bridy rightly 
                                                                                                             
States Senate Legislation & Records (July 5, 2011), available at 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Law%20Professor%20Letter%20July%202011.pdf. 
89
 Belleville, supra note 9, at 322.  
90
 See Steve Crocker, David Dagon, Dan Kaminsky, Danny McPherson & 
Paul Vixie, Security and Other Technical Concerns Raised by the DNS Filtering 
Requirements of the Protect IP Bill (May 2011), available at 
http://domainincite.com/docs/PROTECT-IP-Technical-Whitepaper-Final.pdf.  
91
 An Open Letter from Internet Engineers to the U.S. Congress, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (Dec. 15, 2011), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/Internet-engineers-letter.pdf.   
92
 Greg Sandoval, DNS Provisions Pulled From SOPA, Victory For 
Opponents, Cɴᴇᴛ (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.cnet.com/news/dns-
provision-pulled-from-sopa-victory-for-opponents.  
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argued that the only people in a position to deliver the “best 
available information and arguments” about the technical 
implications and consequences of DNS blocking were “the 
nerds.”93 In spite of this obvious conclusion, however, not a single 
technical expert was invited to the debate or to testify at the House 
Judiciary Committee hearing on SOPA.
94
 While representatives of 
Pfizer and the MPAA testified on behalf of intellectual property 
right-holders, and representatives of Google and MasterCard 
testified on behalf of the online intermediaries whose business 
practices the bill sought to regulate, there was nobody to testify on 
behalf of the average consumer or the technical community.
95
 One 
of the few people aware of the dimension of this problem was 
Representative Jason Chaffetz, who illustrated to his colleagues 
that they were preparing to make Internet policy without any actual 
understanding of the technical consequences: 
 
“I was trying to think of a way to describe my concerns with 
this bill, but basically we are going to do surgery on the 
Internet, and we haven’t had a doctor in the room tell us how 
we[‘re] going to change these organs. We are basically going 
to reconfigure the Internet and how it is going to work without 
bringing in the nerds, without bringing in the doctors.”96 
 
Admittedly, the official exclusion of the Internet engineers 
did not stop them from talking back to the legislature by using the 
channels open to them.
97
 It is also difficult to say whether the 
                                                                                                             
93
 Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic 
Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 153, 162-163 (2012) 
94
 Id. at 161 (quoting Stop Online Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3261 
Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011), page III, available 
at https://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-
154_71240.PDF).  
95
 Id.  
96
 Id. at 156 (quoting Stop Online Piracy Act: Markup Hearing on 
H.R:3261 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 88 (2012) 
(statement of Rep. Chaffetz)). 
97
 Id. at 162. 
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uninvited testimony of the technical community was a decisive 
factor in SOPA’s defeat.98 Regardless of the actual impact, 
however, it seems fair to argue that including the Internet 
engineers in the bill’s deliberations—and so excluding the DNS 
provisions from the bill—would not only have allowed Congress 
to better understand SOPA’s implications, but would have 
decreased the risk of creating such fierce opposition in the first 
place.  
  
D.   Seeking a Democratically Legitimate Solution 
 
Following the overwhelming success of the SOPA protest, 
many commentators were full of hope for a better and more 
balanced copyright regime, going so far as to designate the SOPA 
strike the beginning of a “new era of political engagement based 
on social media.”99 But while social networks may have 
empowered individuals to become more active in the political 
process, multiple factors suggest that protests along the lines of 
SOPA are unlikely to reduce the excessive influence of lobbyists 
and other special interest groups in the legislative process.
100
  
A primary reason is that public participation—as seen in 
the SOPA and PIPA Internet blackouts—depends on the 
availability of a stimulator that provides the required information 
about the legislative activity and further coordinates the opposition 
against it. This tedious and time-consuming function is only 
voluntarily assumed by individuals or groups who fear a specific 
proposal; the general public cannot rely on being informed and 
agitated every time a bill threatens to compromise one of their 
interests.  
Secondly, even if the success of the SOPA protests could 
be repeated on a regular basis, this would give the general public 
                                                                                                             
98
 Id. at 163. 
99
 Lev-Aretz, supra note 14, at 208, (quoting David Binetti, SOPA 
Scorecard: Internet 1, Lobbyists 0, TechCrunch (Jan. 19, 2012), available at 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/19/sopa-scorecard-Internet-lobbyists/).  
100
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the ability to stop, but not to proactively shape new legislation.
101
 
Such destructive power creates an evident problem: if the public 
starts to prevent one unpopular bill after another, Congress might 
decide to rely on alternative methods: including unpopular 
legislative proposals in so-called omnibus bills, for example, which 
cover a variety of unrelated topics and make the individual 
proposal immune from any form of democratic control.  
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(“CISPA”) provides a good example for the concerns mentioned 
above. Initially introduced in the House in November 2011, CISPA 
was intended to facilitate government investigations of cyber 
threats and to safeguard the security of networks against cyber-
attacks.
102
 Although advocates of Internet piracy and civil liberties 
strongly opposed CISPA,
103
 their attempts to invoke the success of 
the SOPA protests did not bear fruit.
104
 The opposition had fewer 
participants, enjoyed less media coverage, and ultimately did not 
succeed in preventing the House from voting on the bill.
105
 Despite 
President Obama’s threat to veto, the House passed CISPA by a 
vote of 248-168.
106
 Only later did the bill fail in the Senate.
107
 
When the House reintroduced the bill in 2013, the Senate did not 
                                                                                                             
101
 Id. at 243. 
102
 Rules Committee Print 112-20 Text of H.R. 3523, The Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), available at 
http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20120423/CPRT-112-HPRT-RU00-
HR3523.pdf.  
103
 Trevor Timm, Cybersecurity Bill FAQ: The Disturbing Privacy Dangers 
in CISPA and How To Stop It, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Apr. 15, 2012), 
available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/old-cybersecurity-bill-faq-
disturbing-privacy-dangers-cispa-and-how-you-stop-it.  
104
 Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 242. 
105
 Id.  
106
 H.R. 3523 Recorded Vote, 26-Apr-2012, 6:31 PM, available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll192.xml.  
107
 Kate Cox, Third Time’s The Charm? House to Take another Stab at 
Terrible CISPA Bill, Tʜᴇ Cᴏɴsᴜᴍᴇʀɪsᴛ (Jan. 8, 2015), available at 
https://consumerist.com/2015/01/08/third-times-the-charm-house-to-take-
another-stab-at-terrible-Internet-bill-cispa/.  
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even look at it, and CISPA died once more.
108
 On March 17, 2015, 
however, a similar bill—known as the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act (“CISA”)—was introduced in the Senate, and passed 
on October 27, 2015.
109
 Due to the White House’s expressed 
support for the bill, CISA was on its way towards becoming law.
110
 
But facing a potential government shutdown, legislators started to 
confer on a new version of the cybersecurity bill and included it in 
a $1.1 trillion federal government spending bill which consisted of 
more than 2,000 pages.
111
 By including CISA in the “Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016”112 which secured governmental funding 
through the next fiscal year, the introduction of the bill became a 
mere matter of form—even though digital rights groups had urged 
the Obama administration to veto the legislation.
113
 This approach, 
however, stripped the final bill of various meaningful privacy 
protections that were included in the Senate’s original version of 
CISA.
114
 More importantly, omnibus legislation requires a strong 
                                                                                                             
108
 Id. 
109
 Trevor Timm, The Senate, Ignorant on Cybersecurity, Just Passed a Bill 
about It Anyway, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (Oct. 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/27/senate-ignorant-of-
cyber-security-just-passed-cisa-bill-anyway.  
110
 Andy Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA into a Budged Bill That’s sure to 
Pass, Wɪʀᴇᴅ (Dec. 16, 2015), available at 
https://www.wired.com/2015/12/congress-slips-cisa-into-omnibus-bill-thats-
sure-to-pass/.  
111
 Aaron Boyd, Final CISA bill Wrapped into Omnibus Package, Fᴇᴅᴇʀᴀʟ 
Tɪᴍᴇs (Dec. 16, 2015), available at 
http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/12/16/cisa-
omnibus/77416226/.  
112
 H.R. 2029—Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (signed into law on 
Dec. 18, 2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/2029/text. 
113
 Andrew Blake, CISA Cyber Bill Squeezed into Omnibus Spending Plan, 
Tʜᴇ Wᴀsʜɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ Tɪᴍᴇs (Dec. 16, 2015),  available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/16/cisa-cyber-bill-squeezed-
omnibus-spending-plan/.  
114
 Sen. Ron Wyden (R-Ore.), Press Release (Dec. 16, 2015),  available at 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-slams-latest-worse-
version-of-cybersecurity-bill.  
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presumption that few members of Congress would actually take 
the time to read and scrutinize the provisions it contains. When 
Sen. Rand Paul was asked why he voted against the spending bill, 
he stated what many were thinking:  
 
“It was over a trillion dollars, it was all lumped 
together, 2,242 pages. Nobody read it, so, frankly, 
my biggest complaint is that I have no idea what 
kind of things they stuck in the bill. […] We were 
given it yesterday or the day before the bill came 
forward, and so this is not a way to run government. 
It’s a part of the reason why government is 
broke.”115 
 
On their face, the events surrounding the SOPA protests in 
2012 primarily demonstrated that the general public in the United 
States demands a right to participate in the future development of 
copyright legislation. From a legal point of view, however, 
SOPA’s failure predominantly shows an unequivocal need for 
procedural control over the federal law-making process in general. 
As shown above, Congress has restricted the right to participate in 
the legislative process to specific special interest groups. In so 
doing, Congress thus may arbitrarily exclude other participants 
affected just as much by the legislative proposal.  
While public protests might serve as a means of last resort 
to stop a legislative project, the lack of public control over the 
federal law-making process begs an important question: what 
could the United States do to allow the general public to participate 
in a more constructive way? In the following section, this Article 
will analyze the current legal situation in Switzerland and 
introduce a legislative process that might present a potentially 
feasible solution for the problems raised above. 
  
                                                                                                             
115
 Bradford Richardson, Paul: Nobody read the $1.1 trillion omnibus bill, 
Tʜᴇ Hɪʟʟ (Dec. 20, 2015),  available at http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/263836-paul-nobody-read-the-11-trillion-omnibus-bill.  
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III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND SWISS DEMOCRACY 
 
A.   The History of Copyright Law in Switzerland 
 
Despite its relatively small size, Switzerland has played a 
significant role in the development of international intellectual 
property law. Not only was Switzerland host to the Berne 
Convention—adopted in 1886—it is also currently home to the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), which 
maintains its headquarters in Geneva.
116
 Despite the country’s 
prominent role with international organizations, however, there is 
probably no area of civil law in Switzerland in which the notion of 
justice is as underdeveloped as in that of copyright.
117
  
While European countries like England, France, and the 
historic state of Prussia adopted copyright laws in the early 19th 
century, Switzerland only enacted its first Federal Copyright Act in 
1883, a mere three years before the Berne Convention passed.
118
 
Prior to its enactment, several Swiss cantons—the member states 
of the Swiss Confederation, equivalent to the states in the U.S.—
wholly resisted the recognition of intellectual property, primarily 
because the supply of neighboring countries with unlicensed works 
was seen as a profitable business.
119
 In spite of this, Switzerland 
played an important role in the Berne Conference, and the Swiss 
Federal Council was given the mandate of writing the draft 
convention.
120
 After the foundation of the ‘Berne Union’, however, 
Switzerland gradually passed over the role of copyright guide to 
                                                                                                             
116
 WIPO, A Brief History,  available at http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/history.html.  
117
 Aloïs Troller, The Hundredth Anniversary of the Berne Convention: the 
Development of Law in the Copyright Field Through the Interaction of the 
Convention and Swiss Legislation, Copyright, Monthly Review of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 208, 208 (Jun. 1986). 
118
 Schweizerisches Institut für Immaterialgüterrecht [Swiss Federal 
Institute of Intellectual Property], Die Geschichte des Urheberrechts,  available 
at https://www.ige.ch/rev-urg/D/heute/duh10.php?m=5&s=1.  
119
 Id.  
120
 Troller, supra note 117, at 210. 
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other states. Scholars have attributed the decision to the somewhat 
arid nature of the subject for a country with a direct democracy, 
but also to the development of law which took place more rapidly 
in centralized countries.
121
  
When the 1883 Swiss Copyright Act was first amended in 
1922, it employed the same language as the revised Berne 
Convention, affording authors fair and efficient protection for a 
fixed term of thirty years.
122
 In the decades that followed, Swiss 
copyright legislation continued to align itself with neighboring 
countries on the scope of its copyrights and refrained from 
including new ideas or original formulae that might have served as 
models for broadening the Berne Convention.
123
 This strategy of 
mere international compliance ended in June 1989, when the Swiss 
Federal Council signed off on a complete revision of the Copyright 
Act with the intention to adapt copyright law to the economic and 
technological developments that had taken place since 1922.
124
  
The current Copyright Act of Switzerland was enacted on 
January 1, 1993; it has been amended seven times, most recently 
on January 1, 2011. One of the most controversial changes of the 
1993 Copyright Act was the introduction of a broad statutory 
private use exception.
125
 Article 19 of the Swiss Copyright Act
126
 
(“CopA”) currently states that published works, with the exception 
of computer programs, may be used for any personal use, copied, 
and shared within a circle of persons closely connected to each 
other, such as relatives or friends.
127
 In line with prevailing legal 
                                                                                                             
121
 Ernst Roethlisberger, Die Revision des schweizerischen 
Urheberrechtsgesetzgebung, reprinted from the review Schweizerische Juristen 
Zeitung, 6th year, 1910, Nos. 20, 21, 221. 
122
 Troller, supra note 117, at 212. 
123
 Id. 
124
 Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht und verwandte 
Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz, URG), BBl 1989 III 477 (1989). 
125
 Id., at 537.  
126
 Urheberrechtsgesetz [URG], Loi sur le droit d’auteur [LDA], Legge sul 
diritto d’autore [LDA] [Copyright Act] Oct. 9, 1992, SR 231.1 (Switz.) 
(hereafter COPA).  
127
 Id. at 19.  
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opinion, the legislator who introduced this exception clarified in 
2006 that ‘private use’ included the right to download audiovisual 
works from the Internet,
128
 regardless of whether the file has been 
downloaded from a legal or illegal source.
129
  
Because of its broad application, the private use exception 
has been met with harsh criticism from copyright-based industry 
representatives such as the IIPA.
130
 It is important to note, 
however, that the private use exception does not include a right to 
use a work outside of the private sphere. This caveat has a large 
impact on the private use doctrine. While downloading a 
copyrighted work from an illegal source—with the exception of 
computer programs—may not constitute copyright infringement, 
Internet users in Switzerland are not allowed to upload or share 
downloaded, purchased, or otherwise acquired copies with the 
public.  
The Swiss Copyright Act grants authors not only the 
exclusive rights to copy and to distribute, but the additional right to 
make the work perceptible.
131
 Through this right, the Swiss 
Copyright Act affords more protection than its U.S. counterpart. 
Although some U.S. copyright owners have attempted to judicially 
create a so-called “making available” right based on the right to 
distribute, the prevailing doctrine holds that the mere offer to 
distribute a copyrighted work does not violate section 106(3) of the 
Copyright Act.
132
  
This broad set of exclusive rights gives Swiss law 
enforcement agencies the opportunity to take strong action against 
online copyright infringement. Despite the widespread use of file-
sharing services in the country, however, it was not until early 
2010 that the first case of online copyright infringement in 
                                                                                                             
128
 Botschaft zum Bundesbeschluss über die Genehmigung von zwei 
Abkommen der Weltorganisation für geistiges Eigentum und zur Änderung des 
Urheberrechtsgesetzes, BBl 3430 (2006). 
129
 Id.  
130
 IIPA, supra note 5. 
131
 COPA, supra note 126, art. 10(2)(f). 
132
 4 William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11.50. 
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Switzerland became public.
133
 In a historical precedent, an 18-
year-old student from Bellinzona was found guilty of up- and 
downloading approximately 4200 copyrighted musical works and 
270 movies, convicted of criminal copyright infringement, and 
sentenced to 30 days in jail on parole and a penalty of 400 Swiss 
Francs. Notwithstanding the comparatively mild monetary 
sentence, the case was heavily criticized for its lack of 
proportionality.
134
 Approximately one year later, the Federal 
Supreme Court of Switzerland ruled that providing hash-links to an 
illegal file-sharing arrangement on a website may constitute 
copyright infringement, regardless of whether the provider of the 
link participates in the actual file-sharing process.
135
 After a 
detailed scrutiny of the technical procedure, the court reasoned that 
providing hash links to copyrighted material violates the author’s 
right to make the work perceptible, since visitors can start the 
download process simply by clicking on the link in question.
136
  
Since most file-sharing services were, and still are, based 
on concurrent downloading and uploading of a single file, these 
two decisions seemed to render the private use exception 
inapplicable with regard to downloading copyrighted works from 
the Internet. Further, taking legal action against copyright 
infringers became even easier when companies like Logistep AG 
from Switzerland started to offer their services to copyright owners 
by de-anonymizing users of file-sharing services. However, the 
anticipated flood of lawsuits and cease-and-desist orders ultimately 
came to a halt before it started. 
                                                                                                             
133
 Paolo Attivissimo, Svizzera, condanna per file sharing, Il 
Disinformatico (Jan. 2, 2010),  available at  
http://attivissimo.blogspot.com/2010/01/svizzera-condanna-per-file-
sharing.html. 
134
 Julia Klein, Filesharing in der Schweiz übertrieben bestraft, Gulli (Jan. 
8, 2010),  available at http://www.gulli.com/news/12144-filesharing-in-der-
schweiz-uebertrieben-bestraft-2010-01-08.  
135
 Bundesgericht [BGer] Feb. 7, 2011, 6B_757/2010. 
136
 Id. (The court further reasoned that even if the file-sharing client is not 
pre-installed on the computer, then the hash-link leads to another website which 
allows the Internet user to download the file-sharing client needed to perform 
the file-sharing process.)  
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B.   The Logistep Decision 
  
1. The Federal Administrative Court’s Ruling in 2009 
 
In May 2008, the Federal Data Protection and Information 
Commissioner of Switzerland (“Federal Commissioner”) brought 
suit against the Swiss company Logistep AG before the Federal 
Administrative Court.
137
 Logistep AG was in the business of 
collecting information about users of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing services who shared copyrighted content for download via 
the service’s networks.138 The information was obtained by 
Logistep’s software File Sharing Monitor.139 File Sharing Monitor 
acted like any other P2P-Client, with the exception that the 
Monitor had been programmed to prevent the subsequent upload of 
downloaded information.
140
  
Whenever the Monitor found a copyrighted work, it 
automatically initiated a download and recorded information such 
as: the Internet Protocol address (“IP address”) of the user offering 
the copyrighted file; the user’s P2P username; the name of the P2P 
network; the name and hash code of the network; and the date and 
time of the download.
141
 Logistep supplied this information to its 
clients in order to assist them in identifying copyright infringers.
142
 
Copyright owners would then use the infringer’s IP address to file 
criminal charges against persons unknown, identify the infringing 
individuals after obtaining access to the criminal files, and use the 
information to seek damages through a civil lawsuit.
143
 
 
  
                                                                                                             
137
 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGer] May 27, 2009, A-3144.  
138
 Id. at A. 
139
 Id. at 2.3.3 
140
 Id. 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. at A. 
143
 Id. 
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a. The Federal Data Protection Act Applies to IP Addresses 
 
Since the case was brought by the Federal Commissioner, 
the Federal Administrative Court first needed to consider whether 
the Federal Act on Data Protection
144
 (“FADP”) applied under the 
circumstances.
145
 In particular, since the identification of the users 
was enabled by collecting their IP addresses, the court had to 
assess whether IP addresses constituted personal data within the 
meaning of Article 3(a) of the FADP.
146
  
Albeit Switzerland is not part of the European Union 
(“EU”), the lack of precedent prompted the court to refer to 
comparative legal analysis and look at the legal situation in the EU, 
where the Article 29 Working Group
147
 had recently concluded 
that static IP addresses constitute personal data because they refer 
to an identifiable individual.
148
 The court adopted this view and 
noted that dynamic IP addresses become equally identifying as 
soon as criminal charges are filed.
149
 As a consequence, the court 
concluded that all IP addresses are personal data within the 
FADP’s meaning.150  
The court further held that Logistep processed the personal 
data within the meaning of Article 3(e) of the FADP,
151
 reasoning 
                                                                                                             
144
 Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz [DSG], Loi fédérale sur la 
protection des données [LPD], Legge federale sulla protezione die dati [LPD] 
[Federal Act on Data Protection], Jun. 19, 1992, SR 235.1 (Switz.).  
145
 BVGer supra note 137, at 1.2. 
146
 Article 3(a) of the FADP holds that personal data is all information 
relating to an identified or identifiable person. 
147
 Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
148
 BVGer supra note 137, at 2.2.3. 
149
 Id. at 2.2.4. Once criminal charges are filed, the law enforcement 
agencies can request Internet Service Providers to determine which user has 
been assigned the IP address at the time of the infringement. 
150
 Id. 
151
 According to Article 3(e) of the FADP, processing means “any 
operation with personal data, irrespective of the means applied and the 
procedure, and in particular the collection, storage, use, revision, disclosure, 
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that Logistep’s File Sharing Monitor collected, saved, and 
transferred information that qualifies as personal data.
152
 The court 
did not follow Logistep’s argument against FADP’s applicability 
based on the allegation that all identified IP addresses and 
copyright owners were domiciled abroad.
153
 Rather, the court held 
that the Act does not contain any provisions regarding its territorial 
applicability, and that the subsidiary principle of territoriality 
makes the Act applicable whenever processing of personal data 
takes place in Switzerland.
154
 
 
b. Logistep’s Data Collection Constitutes a Breach of Privacy 
 
In the main part of the decision, the court assessed whether 
the processing of personal data by Logistep amounted to a breach 
of privacy. FADP’s breach of privacy provision states in general 
that anyone who processes personal data must not unlawfully 
breach the privacy of the data subjects in doing so.
155
 Further, 
Article 12(2) of the Act holds that data processors must not process 
personal data, except if in accordance with the general principles 
of Articles 4, 5(1), and 7(1), and must not process data pertaining 
to a person against that person’s express wish without justification. 
However, Article 12(3) clarifies that there is no breach of privacy 
if the data subject has made the data generally accessible and has 
not expressly prohibited its processing.  
The court disregarded Logistep’s argument that IP 
addresses in P2P networks are generally accessible, holding that 
“even if the Internet could be qualified as an open space […] its 
usage does not mean that personal data should be made accessible 
to all Internet users without further ado. […] IP addresses are 
normally not knowingly communicated, especially not for the 
purpose of having them processed by third parties.” 
The court continued by looking at the general data 
                                                                                                             
archiving or destruction of data.” 
152
 BVGer supra note 137, at 2.3.3. 
153
 Id. at 4.1. 
154
 Id. at 4.2. 
155
 See FADP, art. 12(1). 
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protection principles contained in Article 4, focusing on the act’s 
principles of lawfulness, good faith, transparency, and 
expediency.
156
 Based on the principle of lawfulness, the court held 
that Switzerland does not have a statutory basis which regulates the 
gathering and transfer of personal data in P2P networks, and 
concluded that this type of data collection is not expressly 
forbidden.
157
 Following this conclusion, the court held that the 
principles of good faith and transparency are of particular 
importance in the context of data collection, and highlighted that 
personal data should not be processed if the affected person cannot 
expect such proceedings.
158
 Since Logistep collects personal data 
without the knowledge of the affected individuals, the court 
followed the Federal Commissioner’s reasoning and held that 
Logistep violated the principle of transparency.
159
 With regard to 
the principle of good faith, on the other hand, the court indicated 
that Logistep only collects personal data of P2P users who are 
assumed to be guilty of criminal copyright infringement.
160
 Since 
the current legal framework does not offer copyright owners 
alternative solutions to enforce their rights, and copyright owners 
cannot be expected to silently tolerate violations of their statutory 
rights, the court held that Logistep’s collection of personal data 
does not constitute a violation of the principle of good faith.
161
 
Lastly, the court found a violation of the principle of expediency, 
reasoning that Logistep’s method does not communicate the 
purpose of proceedings to the affected individual, mainly because 
                                                                                                             
156
 These principles are contained in Articles 4(1)-(4) of the FADP, holding 
that (1) personal data may only be processed lawfully; that (2) the processing of 
personal data must be carried out in good faith; that (3) personal data may only 
be processed for the purpose indicated at the time of collection, that is evident 
from the circumstances, or that is provided for by law; and (4) that the collection 
of personal data and in particular the purpose of its processing must be evident 
to the data subject. 
157
 BVGer supra note 137, at 8.3.2. 
158
 Id. at 9.3.1. 
159
 Id. at 9.3.4. 
160
 Id. 
161
 Id. 
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such information would render any investigation impossible.
162
 
 
c. Logistep’s Breach of Privacy is Justified 
 
After holding that Logistep collected personal data in 
violation of the principles of transparency and expediency,
163
 the 
court yet had to determine whether the resulting breach of privacy 
was illegitimate. 
According to Article 13(1) of the FADP, a breach of 
privacy is unlawful unless consented to by the injured party, or 
justified by an overriding private or public interest or by law. 
Holding that there is no consent of the injured party and no 
statutory rule that would justify the injury by law, the court 
assessed whether Logistep’s collection of private data could be 
justified by an overriding private or public interest.
164
 In an 
introductory note to its justification analysis, the court recalled that 
copyright is an absolute right pertaining to the system of property 
ownership and, as such, is afforded protection under the Federal 
Constitution of Switzerland.
165
 Thus, once copyright owners’ 
property rights have been violated, the owners need to be able to 
defend their rights, which requires knowledge of the infringer’s 
identity. Logistep’s collection of personal data would likely help in 
enforcing copyrights against infringers; without collecting their IP 
addresses, it would be impossible to identify the violators and to 
seek damages and injunctive relief against them.
166
 Balancing the 
copyright owners’ interests with the FADP’s privacy principles, 
the court noted that “the interference with the affected person’s 
personal rights does not seem very serious. If the accusations are 
not substantiated to a sufficient degree, criminal proceedings—
albeit they may cause some hardship—would be abandoned, and 
correlating civil claims would be considered unjustified.”167 
                                                                                                             
162
 Id. at 10.3.2. 
163
 Id. at 11.4. 
164
 Id. at 12.3. 
165
 Id. at 12.3.2. 
166
 Id. at 12.3.2. 
167
 Id. at 12.3.2 
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Based on this rationale, the court concluded that Logistep’s 
collection of personal data was justified by an overriding private 
and public interest as defined by Article 13 of the FADP and 
therefore decided to dismiss the case against Logistep AG.
168
  
 
2. The Federal Supreme Court’s Decision in 2010 
 
The Federal Data Commissioner subsequently appealed the 
Federal Administrative Court’s ruling to the Federal Supreme 
Court. In his appellate brief, the Commissioner argued that the text 
of Article 12(2) prohibits the court from taking the justifications in 
Article 13 into account, if, as in this case, one of the general data 
protection principles has been violated.
169
 The Federal 
Commissioner warned that affirming the interpretation of the 
Federal Administrative Court would significantly decrease the 
level of data protection in Switzerland, because the question of 
whether someone’s privacy has been violated would automatically 
be reduced to whether a justification exists, regardless of the 
respective tools that have been used by the data processor.
170
  
In the first part of the decision, the Federal Supreme Court 
confirmed that the IP addresses processed by Logistep qualified as 
personal data within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the FADP, but 
clarified at the same time that this finding did not rise to a general 
rule.
171
 According to the statutory provision, IP addresses can only 
qualify as personal data if they relate to an identified or identifiable 
person.
172
 In the court’s opinion, finding such a relation would 
require more than a mere possibility of identification and depends 
                                                                                                             
168
 Id.  
169
 Ursula Sury, Beschwerdeschrift des EDÖB gegen Logistep AG 17 (Jan. 
9, 2008), available at 
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/datenschutz/00628/00664/index.html?lang=de&do
wnload=NHzLpZeg7t,lnp6I0NTU042l2Z6ln1acy4Zn4Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJC
DdYJ7gGym162epYbg2c_JjKbNoKSn6A--.  
170
 Id. at 28. 
171
 Bundesgericht [BGer] Sep. 8, 2010, 1C_285/2009, at 3.8.  
172
 Id. at 3.2. 
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on the circumstances of the case.
173
 , Given that Logistep’s 
business model was based on de-anonymizing users of file-sharing 
services, however, the court concluded that the statutory 
requirement of identifiability had been met.
174
 The Federal 
Supreme Court further affirmed the holding that Logistep’s 
collection of personal data violated the principles of transparency 
and expediency and therefore constituted a breach of privacy.
175
 
Regarding the applicability of the justifications in Article 
13 of the FADP for violations of the general data protection 
principles, the Supreme Court observed that the legislative history 
was insufficiently instructive and that the relevant legal literature 
tended to reveal partially divided opinions.
176
 Thus, the Federal 
Supreme Court started its analysis by considering Article 13 of the 
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, which grants to 
every person the right to privacy in their private and family life and 
in their home, and in relation to their mail and telecommunications, 
and the right to be protected against the misuse of their personal 
data.
177
 Because this entitlement against misuse represents the core 
of the FADP, the court cautioned that possible justifications should 
only be applied with great restraint.
178
 After affirming the 
Administrative Court’s finding that an overriding private or public 
interest was the only eligible justification in the case, the Supreme 
Court held that Logistep’s interest was purely economic, seeking 
remuneration for an activity that—due to the lack of a statutory 
basis—could lead to great uncertainties with regard to the proper 
procedure and the proper scope of collecting and processing 
personal data in the Internet.
179
 Reluctant to apply an overbroad 
justification, the Federal Supreme Court thus decided that the 
                                                                                                             
173
 Id. (As an example, the court held that the element of identifiability 
might not met if the identification requires so much effort that an actual 
identification by the data processor is not foreseeable under the circumstances.) 
174
 Id. at 3.5. 
175
 Id. at 3.8, 4.  
176
 Id. at 5.2.1, 5.2.2. 
177
 Id. at 6.3.1. 
178
 Id. at 6.3.1. 
179
 Id. at 6.3.3. 
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public interest in effective suppression of online copyright 
infringement would not compensate the uncertainties mentioned 
above.
180
 The court’s most fundamental statement was expressed 
in the final words of the decision: 
 
“It shall be noted that this case only covers the 
respondent’s method of data processing, and is not 
intended to generally give priority to privacy law over 
copyright law. It will be for the legislator, and not for 
the judiciary, to take the appropriate steps to provide for 
a system of copyright protection that conforms to the 
new technologies.”181 
 
Based on this unequivocal statement in support of a clear 
separation of powers, the Federal Supreme Court vacated the 
Federal Administrative Court’s decision and enjoined Logistep AG 
from processing any personal data in P2P networks, and from 
transferring already-collected data to the affected copyright 
owners.
182
 
 
C.   The Impact of “Logistep” on Copyright Enforcement 
 
1. The Legal Appreciation 
 
The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Logistep became the 
subject of a highly controversial debate. While some commentators 
applauded the Supreme Court for increasing the pressure on the 
legislature by clarifying that one infringement does not justify 
another,
183
 others claimed that the decision might end up as a 
pyrrhic victory for data protection, reasoning that such radical 
points of view might turn data protection into offender 
                                                                                                             
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. at 6.4.   
182
 Id. at 7. 
183
 Marc Frédéric Schäfer & Elsa Dordi, Über die Rechtfertigung von 
Persönlichkeitsverletzungen, Medialex 03/2011 142, 148. 
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protection.
184
  
For his part, the Federal Data Commissioner welcomed the 
decision as a warning against the private sector’s increasing 
tendency to take on certain tasks that must remain the prerogative 
of the State.
185
 In particular, the Supreme Court had reproached 
Logistep, not only for having taken advantage of the uncertainties 
created by the company itself in order to demand excessive civil 
damages, but for having done so before any copyright infringement 
had been certified by a criminal court in a manner commensurate 
with the requirements of the rule of law.
186
 The lack of prior 
criminal adjudication had been the Commissioner’s main reason 
for filing the complaint with the Federal Administrative Court; 
during a presentation at the general meeting of SUISSIMAGE
187
 in 
2014, the Commissioner explained that he had conducted several 
inquiries before filing the complaint against Logistep AG and 
learned that the procedures adopted by other copyright holders in 
pursuing alleged copyright infringement differed from the Logistep 
case in this essential point.
188
 Further, he mentioned that the 
umbrella organization IFPI Switzerland
189
 had always waited for a 
                                                                                                             
184
 David Rosenthal, Wenn Datenschutz übertrieben wird oder: Hard cases 
make bad law, Jusletter (Sep. 27, 2010). 
185
 The Federal Data Commissioner (FDPIC), Internet exchanges: decision 
by the Federal Supreme Court, Annual Report 18 (2010/2011),  available at  
https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00153/00184/00196/index.html?lan
g=en. 
186
 The Federal Data Commissioner (FDPIC), Internet file-sharing 
networks—the legal situation after the Logistep ruling, Annual Report 19 
(2011/2012),  available at 
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00153/00154/00170/index.html?lan
g=en.  
187
 Swiss Author’s Rights Cooperative for Audiovisual Works 
188
 Hanspeter Thür, Urheberrechtsverletzungen im Internet—Der Stand der 
Dinge (Apr. 25, 2014),  available at  
http://www.suissimage.ch/fileadmin/content/pdf/9_News/Urheberrechtsverletzu
ngen_im_Internet-Stand_der_Dinge_2014_def.pdf.. 
189
 According to their website, IFPI is the voice of the recording industry 
worldwide, representing the interest of 1,300 record companies from across the 
globe. See About – IFPI – Representing the recording industry worldwide, 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (last visited on Sept. 23, 
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definitive criminal conviction before suing copyright infringers for 
damages in a civil court, which, in the Commissioner’s view, did 
not constitute a violation of the Federal Data Protection Act.
190
  
When IFPI Switzerland and the Swiss Anti-Piracy 
Federation (“SAFE”) contacted the Commissioner after the 
Logistep ruling, he advised them that a violation of privacy rights 
as a result of data processing might still be justified, provided that 
(1) the collection and recording of data does not go beyond what is 
absolutely necessary to file a criminal complaint; that (2) 
negotiations regarding claims for damages between the copyright 
holders and the alleged infringers take place only if an enforceable 
conviction had been pronounced by the courts (or on the alleged 
infringers initiative); and that (3) the copyright holders must “step 
up” their efforts to ensure that the collection of personal data and 
the purpose of their processing is made as clear as possible to the 
persons concerned.
191
 Following this statement, the Federal Data 
Commissioner concluded that “under these conditions…copyright 
infringers on the Internet may continue to be prosecuted in a 
manner which respects data protection rules.”192 
 
2. Non-Enforcement and Diplomatic Implications 
 
Despite the Federal Data Commissioner’s legal assessment, 
most law enforcement authorities in Switzerland interpreted the 
Logistep decision very narrowly and refused to conduct further 
investigations upon criminal copyright complaints, reasoning that 
they would not have the legal basis to retrace the alleged 
infringer’s IP addresses.193 This refusal was mainly based on the 
Supreme Court’s deliberate silence as to whether the prosecution 
                                                                                                             
2016), available at http://ifpi.org/about.php.  
190
 Thür, supra note 188. 
191
 See supra note 187. 
192
 Id. 
193
 Ronny Nicolussi, Druckversuche der USA sind vorerst nicht 
zielführend, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Feb. 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/druckversuche-der-usa-sind-vorerst-nicht-
zielfuehrend-1.18243844.  
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authorities would still be allowed to make use of the information 
obtained by Logistep in violation of the FADP.
194
  
The fact that copyright owners in Switzerland were in 
effect barred from enforcing their statutory rights against file-
sharers drew attention from the United States.
195
 An official report 
was discreetly released on a sub-site of the Federal State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (“SECO”) in February 2014, 
which contained a summary of the confidential round table 
between the SECO, the Embassy of the United States in Bern, 
SAFE, Universal Music, and Walt Disney.
196
 According to the 
report, the subject matter of copyright protection on the Internet 
was brought to SECO’s attention by the U.S. Embassy in Bern 
within the framework of the 2011 “Swiss-U.S. Trade and 
Investment Cooperation Forum.”197 The roundtable’s declared 
objective was to examine how copyright infringement on the 
Internet could be determined and criminally pursued in compliance 
with data protection laws.
198
 As a result of the round table’s 
classified discussions, the participants set up a working group, 
which subsequently set out to clarify the scope of the Logistep 
decision by initiating a model case proceeding.
199
 IFPI Switzerland 
subsequently filed criminal charges against an unknown file-sharer 
in January 2013.
200
 Upon receipt of the complaint, the Public 
Prosecution Department of the Canton of Zurich requested a user’s 
identification based on the alleged infringer’s IP address, but 
ultimately entered a nolle prosequi, reasoning that—because of the 
Logistep decision—the obtained personal data would not be 
admissible in any civil or criminal procedure due to privacy 
                                                                                                             
194
 BGer, supra note 171 at 6.3.3. 
195
 SECO, Roundtable zum Urheberrecht im Internet (Jan. 23, 2014), 
available at https://steigerlegal.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/20140123_seco_roundtable-urheberrecht_bericht.pdf.  
196
 Nicolussi, supra note 190. 
197
 SECO, supra note 192 at 3. 
198
 Id.  
199
 Id.  
200
 Id. at 5. 
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violations.
201
 IFPI appealed the nolle prosequi to the High Court of 
the Canton of Zurich,
202
 which invalidated the Prosecutor’s 
decision to dismiss the proceedings in its decision issued in 
February 2014. The court acknowledged that the alleged 
infringer’s IP address had been obtained unlawfully, but clarified 
that Art. 141 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (“CrimPC”)—
which deals with the admissibility of unlawfully obtained 
evidence—only applies to evidence obtained by law enforcement 
agencies.
203
 The court also held that it was not sufficiently clear 
whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admissible if such 
evidence was obtained by private parties.
204
 The court pointed out 
that while criminal courts must follow the principle of leaving 
doubt for the accused, prosecution authorities must adhere to the 
principle that, in cases of doubt, criminal charges must always be 
brought.
205
 Since criminal proceedings can only be abandoned if 
the inadmissibility of the evidence is manifest, the court decided 
that the question of admissibility must be decided in a criminal 
proceeding by the criminal court, and remanded the case to the 
Public Prosecution Department.
206
 
Although the High Court of the Canton of Zurich 
effectively greenlit criminal copyright enforcement in early 2014, 
things remained surprisingly quiet after the model case proceeding. 
One possible reason behind this may be that the legislature 
eventually responded to the Federal Supreme Court’s request,207 
and decided to examine the possibilities of a new legislative 
                                                                                                             
201
 Id. 
202
 Id. 
203
 Obergericht des Kantons Zürich [OGer ZH], III. Strafkammer, 
UE130087-0/U/br (Mar. 4, 2013) at 5.1. 
204
 Id. 
205
 Id. at 5.2. 
206
 Id.  
207
 In its 2010 Management Report, the Federal Supreme Court has 
repeated its unease with the current regulatory framework and expressly called 
on the legislator “to take appropriate steps to guarantee copyright protection in 
the context of the new technologies.” Bundesgericht, Geschäftsbericht 2010 
[Management Report] 17, available at http://www.bger.ch/2010_d.pdf.  
41
Kunz: The Influence of Special Interest Groups on Copyright Law and Pol
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42       WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS      [VOL. 12:1 
solution. 
 
D.   The Legislative Proposal 
 
1. The AGUR12 Working Group 
 
In August 2012, Federal Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga, 
Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police, 
invited several interested associations and administrative units to 
cooperate in a working group on copyright modernization
208
 called 
“AGUR12”. The Councillor instructed the group to identify 
possibilities for adapting copyright law to recent technical 
developments by the end of 2013.
209
 Of particular interest is the 
fact that, unlike the group of invitees to the House Judiciary 
Committee hearing on SOPA, AGUR12 was not merely comprised 
of artists and industry representatives, but included several 
members who represented the interests of users and consumers.
210
  
In December 2013, AGUR12 published its final report and 
recommended several measures to improve copyright protection on 
the Internet, emphasizing that “while there is consensus regarding 
the overall package, this is not always the case for individual 
recommendations.”211 AGUR12 determined that copyright owners 
should have the right to process Internet connection data for the 
                                                                                                             
208
 In full, the group was described as: a working group on the optimization 
of the collective management of copyright and related rights; see supra note 5. 
209
 Final Report 8, AGUR12 (Dec. 6, 2013), available at 
https://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/33019.pdf.  
210
 The working group AGUR12 was comprised of six creative artist 
representatives, three producer representatives, three user representatives, three 
consumer representatives, and three representatives from the Federal 
Administration who represented the Federal Office of Culture, the Federal 
Office of Communications, and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. The 
Internet Service Providers did not directly participate in the discussion but were 
consulted as technical experts. See AGUR12, supra note 209 at 6-7. 
211
 AGUR12, Proposals of the AGUR12 1 (English translation), available 
at 
https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Urheberrecht/e/Schlussbericht_der_A
GUR12_Empfehlungen_EN.pdf.  
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purpose of investigating copyright infringement to enforce their 
rights prior to notifying the connection’s owner.212 If the subscriber 
of the Internet connection does not take action to prevent further 
infringement upon notification, AGUR12 recommended that the 
access provider should be obliged to disclose the identity of the 
subscriber for the purpose of initiating civil proceedings.
213
 
Although this recommendation would arguably be sufficient 
to solve the problems raised by Logistep, AGUR12 did not hesitate 
to propose regulations beyond the issue of initial identification. In 
keeping with the demands of the copyright-based industries, 
AGUR12 suggested the implementation of a “take down and stay 
down” system, which would require host providers to not only take 
down infringing material upon notice, but to take all reasonable 
measures to prevent any further illegal uploading of such 
content.
214
 AGUR12 also recommended blocking access to web 
portals that feature obvious illegal sources by means of IP and 
DNS blocking,
215
 a suggestion reminiscent of the dire provisions 
included in the disfavored SOPA as discussed above.  
In view of these proposals, the working group’s initial 
recommendation that downloads from illegal sources should 
remain legal
216
 provides little comfort from a user and Internet 
community perspective. This raises an important question: how is 
it possible that a working group that includes both user and 
consumer representatives agree on such far-reaching regulations?  
One possible answer came from the Internet community, 
which—despite AGUR12’s self-portrayal as a broad conglomerate 
of diverse interests—was denied the opportunity to participate in 
the working group’s discussions.217 In reaction to their exclusion, 
members of the Swiss network policy association Digitale Allmend 
publicly criticized AGUR12’s final proposal, concluding that the 
                                                                                                             
212
 Id. at 4. 
213
 Id. 
214
 Id. at 3. 
215
 Id. 
216
 Id. 
217
 Thomas Hartwig, AGUR12: Die nicht gehörte Meinung, Digitale 
Allmend (2014), available at http://www.enterag.ch/hartwig/AGUR12.pdf.  
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so-called “consensus regarding the overall package” was in fact a 
simple imposition of interests attributable to the right-owners’ 
numerical superiority.
218
 Well-known Swiss attorney Martin 
Steiger, whose work focuses on information technology, 
intellectual property, and media law, also criticized AGUR12’s 
final proposal. In his view, an implementation of AGUR12’s 
recommendations would not only lead to a comprehensive 
monitoring of Internet use in Switzerland, but further allow the 
United States’ entertainment industry and other rights holders to 
exercise vigilante justice by recruiting Swiss providers as auxiliary 
policemen.
219
 
 
2. The 2015 Draft Bill 
 
Despite this criticism, the Federal Council mandated in 
June 2014 that the Department of Justice and Police (“FDJP”) 
should prepare a draft bill by the end of 2015.
220
 The draft bill—
submitted in December 2015 and left open for public consultation 
until March 31, 2016—mainly drew upon the recommendations of 
AGUR12.
221
  
In the first part of the draft bill, the proposed Article 62(a) 
deals with the issue surrounding the Logistep decision (as 
discussed in 4.3 supra), but limits the applicability of the provision 
to cases of serious
222
 copyright infringement. Access providers 
                                                                                                             
218
 Id. at 2. 
219
 Martin Steiger, Urheberrecht: Netzsperren, Selbstjustiz und 
Überwachung, Steiger Legal (Dec. 6, 2013), available at 
https://steigerlegal.ch/2013/12/06/urheberrecht-netzsperren-selbstjustiz-und-
ueberwachung/.  
220
 Media Release, Federal Council wants to modernize copyright 
(Unofficial Translation) (Jun. 6, 2014), available at 
https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Urheberrecht/e/Media_Release_6_jun
e_2014.pdf. 
221
 Id. 
222
 According to Article 62(a)(3) of the draft bill, serious copyright 
infringement is limited to two activities: the making accessible of “films that 
have not yet been released” and the making accessible of a “large amounts of 
copyrighted works”. In the Explanatory Report on the draft bill released in 
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should provide serious copyright infringers with two notifications 
and inform them of the legal situation and the potential 
consequences of non-compliance.
223
 If the users continue to 
infringe copyright despite these notifications, the courts will be 
authorized to disclose the offending user’s identity to allow the 
copyright owner to initiate civil proceedings.
224
 Since criminal 
proceedings would no longer be necessary to obtain the user’s 
identity, the draft bill does not criminalize users of P2P networks, 
particularly since the download for exclusive private use would 
remain permitted.
225
 
Although the proposed changes to Article 62(a) could 
potentially solve the issue surrounding the Logistep decision, the 
draft bill tries to combat piracy by implementing additional 
measures “where they are most effective”—namely with providers 
who can act quickly and in a targeted manner.
226
 As a result, 
Article 66(b) includes a ‘takedown’ provision which resembles the 
U.S. DMCA notice-and-takedown process, but expands the process 
by a limited
227
 ‘stay down’ provision that requires service 
providers to prevent the same or other protected works from being 
made available on the same servers again. Furthermore, 
subprovisions (d) through (f) of Articles 66 introduce an “access 
block” provision, which enables copyright owners to request that 
                                                                                                             
December 2015, the FDJP has not defined the term “large amount”, but has used 
the example in which a user of P2P networks has offered around 13,000 
different copyrighted songs. See generally Erläuternder Bericht zu zwei 
Abkommen der Weltorganisation für geistiges Eigentum und zu Änderungen des 
Urheberrechtsgesetzes, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement (Dec. 
11, 2015),  available at 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/ejpd/aktuell/news/2015/2015-12-11/vn-ber-
d.pdf (hereinafter “Explanatory Report”).  
223
 Media Release, supra note 220. 
224
 Id.  
225
 Id. 
226
 Id. 
227
 In the Explanatory Report, the FDJP clarified that the duty to assure a 
“stay down” is limited to technical and economic feasibility and proportionality, 
reasoning that a comprehensive surveillance would be unsuitable and not 
compatible with data protection and privacy laws. See Explanatory Report, 
supra note 222. 
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the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property block access to 
a foreign website, upon making a prima facie case that the website 
in question mainly contains infringing material. Like the ‘stay 
down’ provision in Article 66(b), the ‘access block’ provision 
seeks a balance between copyright law, due process, and free 
speech by allowing the affected foreign access provider to file a 
written objection within 30 days, and clarifying that objections will 
have a suspensory effect. 
Although the FDJP mainly followed the recommendations 
of AGUR12 and included a total of three new measures to combat 
piracy, the draft bill tries not only to uphold the principle of 
proportionality, but further limits the applicability of the provisions 
to severe cases. Based on their conflicting interests, it is likely that 
neither the Internet community nor the copyright-based industries 
will be fully satisfied with the proposed compromise. Whether or 
not the amended Copyright Act will ultimately include these 
provisions, however, there are good reasons for the FDJP to steer a 
middle course. 
 
E.   Direct Democracy vs. Public Choice 
 
1. Direct Democracy—An Overview 
 
As previously illustrated, legislative lobbying is not unique 
to the United States. The vehemence with which copyright-based 
industries are currently trying to influence the development of 
Swiss copyright law is strongly reminiscent of the legislative 
process in the United States described by Litman. However, owing 
to the fact that Switzerland and the United States use vastly 
different systems of democratic governance, the similarities end 
where they begin. 
At its beginning, the United States represented the only 
fully functioning democracy in the Western world.
228
 Today, most 
industrial countries have adopted a democratic model that allows 
                                                                                                             
228
 K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International 
Lessons in Referendum Democracy, Temple University of the Commonwealth 
System of Higher Education, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 821, 822 (Fall 2006). 
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citizens to participate in one way or another, and every continent 
contains countries with this form of government.
229
 As the number 
of democracies has grown, the “undemocratic” nature of the 
United States governmental system—such as the inherent 
prevention from electing Senators and electors for the Presidential 
election—has become increasingly apparent.230 Although some of 
these undemocratic elements have been removed from the system 
over time, the federal government still lacks a key component of a 
democracy: a system that allows the people to participate in the 
legislative process directly.
231
 Despite its longstanding democratic 
tradition, the United States remains one of the few democracies in 
the world that has never held a federal referendum or mass 
electorate vote on a public issue.
232
 
By contrast, European countries have a long history of 
referendums, both at the local and national level.
233
 This is 
particularly true for Switzerland. Like most other Western 
countries, Switzerland is a representative democracy in which 
citizens with the right to vote elect public officials who effectively 
represent the general public. But, unlike a majority of other 
countries, Switzerland employs several direct democratic 
instruments that allow the general public to intervene in the law-
making process, not only on a federal level, but on all political 
levels, including twenty-six sovereign cantons and more than 2,000 
autonomous municipalities.
234
 A detailed discussion of all these 
instruments would go beyond the scope of this Article; however, 
                                                                                                             
229
Id. at 822 (quoting Steve Muhlberger, The View of Tatu Vanhanen, in 
Chronology of Modern Democracy (2003), available at 
http://www.nipissingu.ca/department/history/muhlberger/histdem/vanhanen.htm 
(citing Tatu Vanhan, The Emergence of Democracy: A Comparative Study of 
199 States, 1850-1979 app. At 137-159 (1984))). 
230
 DuVivier, supra at 229 at 822. 
231
 Id. at 823. 
232
 Id. at 823. 
233
 Id. at 834. 
234
 Bruno Kaufmann, How direct democracy makes Switzerland a better 
place, The Telegraph (May 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1435383/How-direct-democracy-makes-
Switzerland-a-better-place.html.  
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two direct democratic instruments play an important role in the 
course of the ongoing revision of the Swiss Copyright Act: the 
constitutional right to hold an optional referendum and the 
statutory right to participate in the mandatory consultation 
procedure.  
 
2. The Optional Referendum 
 
Although the vast majority of federal laws and legislative 
acts in Switzerland enter into force without being contested in a 
popular vote, every citizen who is eligible to vote has the 
constitutional right to oppose any act of parliament by launching 
an optional referendum.
235
 Article 141(a) of the Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states that any federal 
act
236
 shall be submitted to a vote of the People if, within 100 days 
of the official publication of the enactment, any 50,000 persons 
eligible to vote—or any eight cantons—request it.  
Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1848, 
Switzerland has held 180 optional referendums, in which a total of 
102 legislative proposals were rejected by the voters.
237
 In the first 
half of 2016, Switzerland held optional referendums against the 
addition of a second tube to the existing Gotthard tunnel,
238
 the 
                                                                                                             
235
 The Swiss Authorities Online, Referendums, (last visited May 27, 2016), 
available at https://www.ch.ch/en/referendum/.  
236
 The optional referendum in Art. 141 applies to (a) federal acts, to (b) 
emergency federal acts whose term of validity exceeds one year, (c) federal 
decrees, provided that the Constitution or an act so requires, and (d) 
international treaties that are of unlimited duration and may not be terminated, 
provide for accession to an international organization, or contain important 
legislative provisions or whose implementation requires the enactment of federal 
legislation. 
237
 See, e.g. Federal Statistical Office, Angenommene und verworfene 
Abstimmungsvorlagen, nach Typ (last visited August 31, 2016), available at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/eidg__vol
ksinitiativen.html.  
238
 Voted on Feb. 28, 2016. The referendum against the addition of a 
second tube to the Gotthard tunnel was rejected by 57% of the People. See 
Bundesgesetz über den Strassentransitverkehr im Alpengebiet (Sanierung 
Gotthard-Strassentunnel), Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confederation 
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proposed revision of the Federal Asylum Act,
239
 and the proposed 
revision of the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction,
240
 
all of which were initiated by public interest groups but were 
rejected by a clear majority of voting citizens. 
As these examples suggest, the optional referendum is an 
instrument primarily used to challenge legislative decisions 
relating to highly controversial topics. Allowing the general public 
an opportunity to voice their opinions in these often-emotional 
questions is a core element in Swiss politics.  
Despite their many advantages, however, optional 
referenda are accompanied by at least two shortcomings. First, the 
power of referenda is limited in the sense that they are able to 
destroy, but not to generate, legislative proposals and solutions. 
This problem is comparable to the SOPA protests. The opponents 
of SOPA had a clear goal that was easy to deliver, and even easier 
to follow by the general public: stop the bill.
241
 As demonstrated 
by the ultimate success of the SOPA protests, preventing 
legislation is much easier than enacting it.
242
 Further, as a result of 
their accessibility, optional referenda can also be invoked by 
smaller groups that might be perceived as controversial, which 
                                                                                                             
suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra (Feb. 28, 2016), available 
at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2016/014.
html.  
239
 Voted on Jun. 5, 2016. The referendum against the revision of the 
Federal Asylum Act was rejected by 66.8% of the People. See Abstimmungen – 
Indikatoren, Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confederation suisse 
Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra (Jun. 5, 2016), available at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2016/025.
html.  
240
 Voted on June 5, 2016. The referendum against the revision of the 
Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction has been rejected by 62.4% of 
the People. See Abstimmung vom 5. Juni 2016: Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, 
Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confederation suisse Confederazione 
Svizzera Confederaziun svizra (Jun. 5, 2016), available at  
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2016/024.
html.  
241
 Id.   
242
 Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 243. 
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requires the implementation of safeguards that prevent the optional 
referendum from being abused and the legislative process from 
being blocked by recurring challenges. This is where the 
mandatory consultation procedure comes into play. 
 
3. The Consultation Procedure 
 
Despite broad direct-democratic opportunities to intervene 
in the lawmaking process, only around seven percent of all federal 
legislative decisions in Switzerland actually lead to a 
referendum.
243
 The low ratio of legislative challenges is due to a 
process that not only seeks parliamentary compromise, but reduces 
the risk of referenda
244
 by incorporating into the process all 
political forces within the country that are legally permitted and 
capable of launching them.
245
  
The incorporation of such forces happens primarily during 
the pre-parliamentary phase of the legislative process, which is 
divided into two stages. In the first stage, the Federal Council 
nominates an expert committee—such as the working group 
AGUR12, in the case of the revisions to the Copyright Act—that 
consists of experts and participants who represent the stakes of 
affected interest groups.
246
 After the committee’s report, the first 
draft of the bill is sent to the cantons, the political parties, and 
relevant interest groups in order to collect their views.
247
 The 
process of sending the draft bill to parties beyond the 
administrative body for the purpose of commenting is referred to 
                                                                                                             
243
 Wolf Linder, Das politische System der Schweiz, in Wolfgang Ismayr, 
Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas 455, 467 (4th ed. 2009). 
244
 A good example for such a risk reducing compromise is the newly 
proposed Article 62(a), limiting the duty to notify and de-anonymize users to 
cases of “serious” copyright infringement. See supra at Part 4.5. 
245
 Linder, supra note 243. 
246
 Fritz Sager & Christine Zollinger, The Swiss Political System in 
Comparative Perspective in SWITZERLAND IN EUROPE—CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE IN THE SWISS POLITICAL ECONOMY 37 (Christine Trampusch, André 
Mach ed., 2011). 
247
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as the ‘consultation procedure’. Though time-consuming, this 
procedure is an effective instrument in enabling the general 
public—and interest groups that lack the budget and network for 
strategic lobbying—to participate in the federal legislative process, 
because it ultimately allows anyone subject to the law to express 
an opinion. 
Despite its importance and storied history as a tradition of 
Swiss governance, the consultation procedure in Switzerland was 
not statutorily regulated until 2005, when the Federal Act on the 
Consultation Procedure (“CPA”) was enacted.248 According to 
Article 2 of the CPA, the purpose of the consultation procedure is 
to allow the cantons, political parties, and interest groups to 
participate in the shaping of opinion and the decision-making 
process of the Confederation by providing information on material 
accuracy, feasibility of implementation, and public acceptance of a 
federal project.
249
 While the official invitation to participate in the 
consultation procedure is limited to the parties mentioned above, 
Article 4 of the CPA clarifies that anyone and any organization 
may submit an opinion. Once an opinion has been submitted, it 
must be acknowledged, considered, and evaluated by the authority 
in charge of conducting the consultation procedure, which is either 
the Federal Council or the Federal Department that proposes the 
bill.  
According to the Federal Council’s dispatch on the revision 
of the CPA in 2013, these limited rights do not confer a legal 
entitlement to being substantively considered in the legislative 
decision.
250
 Since the revision in 2013, however, the authority in 
charge of the procedure is bound to summarize the results of the 
consultation procedure in a report that responds to all submitted 
opinions and summarizes their content clearly and without bias.
251
 
Further, all submitted opinions must be made publicly available by 
permitting their inspection, providing copies, or publishing them in 
                                                                                                             
248
 Botschaft zur Änderung des Vernehmlassungsgesetzes (Botschaft) 
(Nov. 6, 2013), BBl 8880 (2013).  
249
 Consultation Procedure Act, supra note 12.  
250
 Botschaft, supra note 248 at 8905. 
251
 Id. at 8906. 
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electronic form.
252
 As a consequence, the consultation procedure 
not only allows engaged citizens to be heard, but also provides 
interested citizens a summary of all arguments made both against 
and in support of the proposed legislation. 
 
4. Direct Democracy in Application 
 
Granting direct democratic tools such as the consultation 
procedure is not without consequences. A study conducted in 2006 
showed that the pre-parliamentary phase stage in Switzerland lasts 
an average of three years, followed by a parliamentary phase of 
approximately another year.
253
 Assuming that legislators are 
generally interested in rapidly bringing their projects to a close, it 
is justifiable to ask whether the benefits of broader public 
participation effectively offset the disadvantages affiliated with 
legislative delay. But while answering this question largely comes 
down to a matter of priorities, it would be wrong to assert that the 
Swiss legislature has been inactive in recent years. Bearing in mind 
that copyright legislation is a highly complex task that is further 
complicated by the divergent interests of the parties involved, it 
should come as no surprise that the ongoing revision of the Swiss 
Copyright Act does not constitute an exception to the excessively 
long duration of federal legislative projects.  
Following the proposals of the working group AGUR12, 
the Federal Council mandated the FDJP in June 2014 to prepare a 
draft bill by the end of 2015.
254
 The draft bill was submitted on 
December 11, 2015 and was open for public consultation until 
March 31, 2016.
255
 Based on their results, the two chambers of the 
federal parliament will separately debate both the draft bill and the 
arguments brought forward during the consultation procedure. 
Once both chambers agree on a joint version, the parliament will 
pass a final version of the bill, which will be subject to the optional 
                                                                                                             
252
 Consultation Procedure Act, supra note 13, art. 9(2). 
253
 Pascal Sciarini, Le procéssus législatif, in Handbuch der Schweizer 
Politik 501 (2006). 
254
 Media Release, supra note 220.  
255
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referendum. 
Despite this clear roadmap, the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (“IIPA”) has long recommended placing 
Switzerland on the USTR’s Watch List, arguing that Switzerland 
“makes no claim that it lacks the resources or technological 
expertise to make swift change.”256 In the IIPA’s view, the “fact 
that online piracy continues to escape any liability in Switzerland 
can only be attributed to a reluctance on the part of Swiss 
leadership to live up to its obligations under international 
agreements.”257  
While the IIPA’s criticism seems to go only to the slowness 
of Switzerland’s system, its choice of words ultimately reveals a 
lack of understanding or sympathy for Switzerland’s direct 
democratic approach. That Switzerland has not made a ‘swift 
change’ has nothing to do with resources or technological 
expertise; rather, it is based on the reality that proper policymaking 
in a functioning democracy requires a spirit to compromise and the 
willingness to take the time needed to find a proper balance of 
interests. Since the deliberations between the copyright owners and 
the general public have not yet revealed a consensus, the policy 
change requested by the IIPA is much more than a matter of mere 
implementation. The legislature in Switzerland understands that 
the functioning of a democratic state governed by the rule of law is 
not measured by the substance of the law, but rather by the 
procedure that leads to its enactment.  
Unfortunately, the USTR recently decided to follow the 
IIPA’s unilateral requests, and placed Switzerland on the Watch 
List in 2016. In its Special 301 Report, the USTR justified the 
decision as follows:  
 
“The United States welcomes the steps taken by 
Switzerland in response to this serious concern […]. 
However, more remains to be done and the United 
States continues to encourage the Swiss government to 
move forward expeditiously with concrete and effective 
                                                                                                             
256
 IIPA, supra note 5. 
257
 Id. 
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measures that address copyright piracy in an 
appropriate and effective manner, including through 
legislation, administrative action, consumer awareness, 
public education, and voluntary stakeholder 
initiatives.” 
 
By putting Switzerland on the Special 301 Watch List, the 
U.S. government has demonstrated its eagerness to observe the 
revisions to the Swiss Copyright Act. Assuming that the U.S. is 
acquainted with the legislative process in Switzerland, however, it 
is unclear what value such encouragements are supposed to 
contribute to the current debate. As a result of its direct democratic 
instruments, the federal legislative process in Switzerland is to a 
large extent immune from being influenced by foreign authorities. 
While applying soft pressure might work on a government-to-
government level, the Swiss public’s opinion will at most be 
negatively affected by reading about admonitory commentary from 
the other side of the Atlantic. Unsurprisingly, the Head of the 
Federal Institute of Intellectual Property recently declared that 
further procedure with regard to the ongoing revision will depend 
on the result of the consultation procedure, and not on the 
placement on an American Watch List.
258
 Thus, instead of 
criticizing Switzerland for seeking a workable compromise among 
its citizens, the United States government might be well-advised to 
shift its focus on the advantages of the Swiss system, and consider 
whether they might in fact help solve some of its own issues. 
 
IV. LEARNING FROM SWITZERLAND 
 
In a paper on the policymaking dynamics of ACTA and 
SOPA/PIPA, Annemarie Bridy draws on German sociologist and 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of procedural 
democracy. She concludes that copyright policymaking requires 
                                                                                                             
258
 Jon Mettler, Urheberrecht: Neuer Konflikt mit den USA in Sicht, Berner 
Zeitung (May 14, 2016), available at 
http://www.bernerzeitung.ch/ausland/amerika/Urheberrecht-Neuer-Konflikt-mit-
den-USA-in-Sicht/story/21383943.  
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both informal and formal mechanisms for allowing members of the 
public to “talk back” to the government.259 Recognizing that 
political compromise is necessary, Bridy argues that a 
democratically legitimate compromise cannot be reached in an 
“epistemic vacuum where corporate interests are the primary 
drivers of policy formation, while other concerns are viewed as 
irrelevant or incidental.”260 To secure democratic legitimacy in the 
policymaking process, the public must be able to participate 
directly, which requires not only a right to know, but also a right to 
be heard.
261
 Building on this groundwork offered by Bridy, this 
Article tries to propose a solution that might enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the legislative process in the United 
States. 
The strong public opposition which ultimately led to the 
defeat of SOPA and PIPA emphasizes the importance of 
counterbalancing the influence of lobbyists and special interest 
groups in the legislative process. As such, Congress should 
consider the events surrounding SOPA/PIPA as a valuable lesson 
in policymaking for three distinct reasons. First, they illustrate that 
the exclusion of certain groups, such as engineers and the legal 
community, from the lawmaking process—intentional or 
unintentional—can have drastic consequences for the success of 
legislation. Second, the overwhelming public opposition that 
materialized during the SOPA/PIPA protests illustrated that the 
public, once sufficiently informed, demands an opportunity to be 
heard and will not refrain from expressing its disapproval of 
legislative proposals by signing petitions, sending emails, and 
making phone calls to representatives. Third, and most 
importantly, Internet companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google have not only become increasingly active in the lobbying 
field,
262
 but have also demonstrated their ability to successfully 
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 Bridy, supra note 93, at 163 
260
 Id. at 162 
261
 Id. at 163 (quoting Habermas, supra note 1 at 318). 
262
 Facebook’s lobbying budged for 2015 was nearly 10 million USD, 
while Google spent nearly 17 million USD during 2015. See Brian Fung, This 
one thing could hurt Apple’s case in Washington, The Washington Post (Feb. 
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shape public opinion.
263
  
As previously discussed, the Swiss legislature has 
successfully narrowed the susceptibility of its legislative process to 
lobbyism by enacting the Federal Act on the Consultation 
Procedure in 2005. The CPA fulfills two equally important 
functions. While the Act allows each citizen or interest group to 
submit their opinions in the drafting phase, it also ensures that the 
opinion’s content is summarized in a clear and unbiased manner 
and that all such summaries are made available to the public.  
The implementation of a public consultation procedure in 
the federal legislative process in the United States would most 
likely have prevented the SOPA/PIPA debacle. A mandatory 
consultation procedure based on the Swiss legislative model would 
have ensured that specialists were heard, eliminating the issues that 
arose out of the fact that no single technical expert testified 
regarding SOPA at the House Judiciary Committee. By taking the 
specialists’ contributions into account, the drafters of the bill could 
have met their concerns by adapting or deleting the most 
controversial provisions. Instead, the public’s unheard disapproval 
culminated in the SOPA protests, which had unfortunately become 
the general public’s only real chance to be heard in the legislative 
process. A public consultation procedure would have empowered 
the Internet community to voice its opinion in a concise manner 
and so indicated to Congress an overall lack of acceptance that 
might possibly have been cured by weakening the draft.  
Most importantly, the consultation procedure would have 
ensured that the general public had access to an unbiased summary 
of all arguments that have been made in support and against the 
proposed legislation. Following the events surrounding the SOPA 
protests, proponents of the bills argued that Wikipedia, Google, 
and others manufactured controversy by “unfairly equating SOPA 
with censorship” and crossed the “ethical boundary between the 
neutral reporting of information and the presentation of editorial 
                                                                                                             
25, 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/02/25/apples-most-glaring-weakness-in-washington/.  
263
 Lev-Aretz, supra note 14 at 239. 
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opinions.”264 Regardless of whether these allegations were 
justified, they raised an important point. Due to its accessibility, 
the Internet today plays a pivotal role in the procurement of 
information. While the Supreme Court’s holding that the Internet 
must be awarded the full protection of the First Amendment is to 
be welcomed,
265
 the widespread lack of accuracy and objectivity  
on social media platforms and other websites can make it difficult 
for individuals to form a balanced opinion. For a functioning 
democracy, access to unbiased information is vital. The 
implementation of a public consultation procedure would 
undoubtedly help this cause, not only by creating a platform to 
share information, but also by providing an impartial summary of 
all opinions advanced to the general public.  
A mandatory consultation procedure for federal legislative 
proposals would further prevent Congress from passing 
controversial legislative proposals such as CISPA (or CISA) as 
part of an omnibus bill. Although a detailed analysis of the 
deficiencies of omnibus legislation would go beyond the scope of 
this Article, such legislation would naturally run afoul of any 
policymaking process based on Jürgen Habermas’ ideas of 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Due to the lack of consensus as to the definition of 
copyright infringement in the United States, the current 
international framework does not provide an effective solution to 
copyright infringement caused or facilitated by websites outside of 
the United States’ reach. The anti-piracy bills SOPA and PIPA, 
introduced in 2011, were intended to address this problem on a 
national level. Instead, these led to a public protest so powerful 
that it effectively brought copyright legislation in the United States 
                                                                                                             
264
 Cary H. Sherman, Op-Ed., What Wikipedia Won’t Tell You, New York 
Times (Feb. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/what-wikipedia-wont-tell-
you.html.  
265
 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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to a halt. While copyright-based industries have successfully 
influenced U.S. copyright legislation since the enactment of the 
1909 Copyright Act, the SOPA protests brought to light a fierce 
resistance from various other interest groups. As a result of this 
resistance, the proposed votes on the bills have been postponed 
until a wider agreement on a solution can be found. 
As explained in Part II, it is likely that the events 
surrounding SOPA and PIPA will remain unique. Nevertheless, the 
protests exposed the shortcomings of the legislative process in the 
United States. Combined with the divergent interests between the 
parties affected by copyright law, the lack of public inclusion 
renders a workable solution unlikely. Presuming that compromise 
is the only way to break this political deadlock, this Article 
recommends a solution using the Swiss federal legislative process 
as a model. Although Switzerland’s mandatory procedure slows 
the legislative process considerably, the inclusion of citizens 
subject to the law endows the legislative process with the required 
democratic legitimacy.  
Recognizing that the eventual legislative proposal cannot 
consider each and every opinion expressed, the consultation 
procedure nevertheless allows engaged citizens to be heard and 
provides interested citizens a summary of all arguments that are 
being made both in support and against the legislative proposal. 
The procedure further ensures that experts can be heard by the 
legislator. The earlier the experts’ voices are heard, the bigger the 
odds that a controversial legislative proposal can be adjusted in 
time to minimize its negative impact. Last, but not least, the 
consultation procedure serves as an effective counterbalance to 
prevent special interest groups from asserting undue influence over 
the legislative process. Thus, the procedure enhances public 
acceptance of copyright law and policy. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that the implementation of a 
public consultation procedure based on the Swiss model would: (1) 
make federal copyright legislation less susceptible to lobbying and 
thus prevent the inclusion of infeasible and ill-considered 
provisions; (2) enhance the U.S.’s democratic legitimacy and 
overall acceptance of copyright legislation by allowing citizens to 
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participate in public policymaking; (3) inform the general public 
about the actual consequences of the proposal by providing an 
overview of the opinions advanced in its support or opposition; and 
(4) ultimately help to break the existing standoff in copyright 
policymaking by creating a compromise that properly balances the 
diverging interests of copyright owners and the general public. 
 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 With the exception of computer programs, the download of 
copyrighted works for private use does not constitute 
copyright infringement in Switzerland and is protected by 
the so called private use exception. The upload of 
copyrighted works to unknown persons, however, is not 
covered by this exception. 
 The Federal Supreme Court in Switzerland considers IP 
addresses as personal data protected by the Federal Act on 
Data Protection, provided that they relate to an identified or 
identifiable person. This means that, without consent, IP 
addresses cannot be processed in order to de-anonymize 
users of peer-to-peer networks. 
 The Swiss Copyright Act is currently under revision and 
will presumably be enacted within the following two years. 
As such, attorneys with Swiss interests should not base 
long-term advice on provisions under review 
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